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Since 1957, Malaysia has faced external and internal security threats. 
Over time, Malaysia has succeeded in solving the external threats but internal 
threats remained. The internal threats have come in many forms, including ethnic 
conflict, religious extremism and deviationism, and terrorism. Since the safety of 
the public lies in the hands of the government, measures have been taken to 
ensure the nation’s stability and security, including restriction on civil and political 
liberties. This thesis examines human rights in Malaysia with a special focus on 
civil and political rights, particularly during the government of Prime Minister 
Mahathir. This thesis also examines the different rationalities used by the 
government in order to legitimize the restriction of human rights. The rationales 
that have been used by the government were: the anti-communist, racial 
harmony, the “Asian values” and developmentalism, and terrorism. This thesis 
analyzes the reasons behind changes in the rationales and the consequences for 
internal security. In addition, this thesis addresses the question of the potential 
impact on internal security if human rights were to be improved. In the final 
chapter, the thesis summarizes the findings and gives an outlook of the 
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You have to do the right thing. It may not be in your power; maybe 
not in your time, that there'll be any fruit. But that doesn't mean you 
stop doing the right thing. You may never know what results come 
from your action. But if you do nothing, there will be no result.1  
           Mahatma Gandhi 
A. BACKGROUND 
In the name of humanity, countries in today's "civilized" world are being 
judged by the standard of human rights that they uphold. Respect for human 
rights is one of the key principles behind the effective functioning of a nation's 
constitution, law and government.2 Many countries, especially in the West, are 
concerned about and emphasize human rights in their foreign and economic 
policies. These countries uphold the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), adopted on December 10, 1948. The UDHR was followed by the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in 1976. A series of 
additional covenants3 were later made and ratified by the members of the United 
Nations (UN).  These collected statements, known as the International Bills of 
Rights, have become instruments for interpreting human rights as described in 
the UN Charter. 
                                            
1 Mahatma Gandhi quoted in Aliran Homepage. Database on-line.  Available at 
http://www.aliran.com; accessed 21 May 2005. 
2 Lt Col Rosli bin Mohd Yusof, “Human Rights and National Security in Malaysia,” (Master’s 
Thesis, Malaysia National University, 2004), 2.  
3 Apart from the ICCPR and ICESCR, the other conventions are the 1965 International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), the 1979 Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the 1984 Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT) and the 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
1 
The UDHR has two fundamental pillars: it declares that all human beings 
should have the freedom from fear and freedom from want.4 Implicitly, the first 
pillar of the Declaration represents an ideal state where people would have the 
widest range of political rights: the right to a democratically-elected government, 
rule of law, freedom of expression and freedom from unlawful detention, 
prosecution and torture. One might say that this part of the Declaration has been 
in the spotlight for the last half of the past century, and has been the main focus 
of the 65 states that were its original signatories.5 
The other pillar of the Declaration is the right to the basic necessities of 
food, shelter, health, education and employment. As developing countries seek 
to relieve themselves of the burdens of colonialism, occupation, war and 
starvation, economic rights and material progress have become equal in 
importance to political rights. For the vast majority of developing countries in 
Asia, Africa and Latin America, these are the rights that matter most.6 Malaysia, 
for instance, inherited a democratic system of regular elections and universal 
suffrage from the British. Its success in addressing the communist threat and the 
race riots in 1969 made Malaysia, as a nation, free from fear. Since its inception, 
it has focused its energies on ridding its population from want and providing fair 
opportunities for all Malaysians.7  
                                            
4 “Freedom from fear means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such 
a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression 
against another neighbor anywhere in world. Meanwhile freedom from want means economic 
understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants 
everywhere in world.”  See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “The Four Freedoms” (Excerpts from an 
address to U.S. Congress). Available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/hrintro.fourfree.htm; 
accessed 23 January 2006. See also Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1998), 23 – 25 and Jack Donnelly, “The Social Construction of International 
Human Rights,” in Human Rights in Global Politics, ed. Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, 71 – 
102, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 72. 
5 Dato’ Seri Najib Razak, “Human Rights: Now and the Future,” (Keynote Address, 
SUHAKAM Convention, Kuala Lumpur, 2003). 
6 Chandra Muzaffar, Human Rights and the New World Order (Penang: Vinlin Press Sdn 
Bhd, 1993), 13. 
7 Ibid. 
2 
In Malaysia today, despite the UDHR, various human rights issues have 
yet to be resolved and remain important concerns on the international agenda.8 
The nature of the political system and the conditions of its legitimacy, along with 
the social, cultural, religious, and ethnic make-up of Malaysian society, have 
caused continuous violations of human rights. Amnesty International reports that, 
“A pattern of violations – including significant restrictions on civil and political 
rights – including sporadic detention without trial of real or alleged political 
opponents has become institutionalized in Malaysia.”9 Not only has the 
Malaysian government worked to undermine the principles of international 
scrutiny and universality, it has attempted also to suppress domestic human 
rights advocates.10 And when the Malaysian government did take human rights 
initiatives (for example, establishing  a National Human Rights Commission), 
such actions have more often than not been aimed at improving the 
government’s image rather than addressing the root causes of abuse.11 Those 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) which are committed to human rights 
have pushed the government to match its rhetoric with realistic or responsible 
action.12 
Malaysia is one of few states of the postcolonial developing world in which 
democracy was installed at the time of independence (1957). However, pressure 
from subsequent internal and external threats has compromised and eroded the 
democratic processes in Malaysia. Under colonial rule, a state of emergency was 
declared in response to the violent communist campaign. During this period, the  
 
                                            
8 Yusof, 2.  
9 Amnesty International Country Report, “Malaysia: Human Rights Undermined: Restrictive 
Laws in a Parliamentary Democracy,” September 1999, 1 – 92. Database on-line. Available at 
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/Malaysia/document.doc; accessed 12 June 2005.   
10 The Malaysian government saw the parties that advocate democracy and human rights as 
“anti-government” and as a “foreign government tool” to weaken the existing government.  
11 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric and Reality” in Southeast 
Asia in the New World Order: The Political Economy of a Dynamic Region, ed. David Wurfel and 
Bruce Burton (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 75.  
12 NGOs like HAKAM, Aliran and SUARAM have combined together to push the government 
to address human rights issues.  See Robinson, 74. 
3 
British introduced the Internal Security Act (ISA), the Official Secrets Act (OSA) 
and the Sedition Act, under which “suspected communists” could be held without 
trial.13  
After the violent communist campaign ended in 1960, Malaysia faced 
three immediate problems.  The first was Indonesia's harsh opposition to the 
creation of a Federation of Malaysia.14 The second was the Philippines’s claim 
on Sabah.15 The third problem was the incorporation of the overwhelmingly 
ethnic Chinese state of Singapore.16 The Chinese in peninsular Malaya and the 
indigenous groups in Sarawak were less supportive of the formation of Malaysia. 
They commonly used terms like “equality,” “fairness” and “justice” when talking 
about their grievances against the federal government. Sarawak contributed 
more to the federal government than they received, which they still see as unfair 
today.17 In 1965, the federal government finally declared an emergency in 
Sarawak and later disbanded the opposition-controlled state assembly.   
Tensions between the ethnic Chinese and Malay populations, which 
culminated in race riots in May 1969, contributed to modifying Malaysia’s earlier 
liberal orientation.18 Following the 1969 riots, internal security laws were  
 
                                            
13 Damien Kingsbury, South-East Asia: A Political Profile (Melbourne: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 272.  
14 This confrontation, which began in 1963, was the greatest threat to Malaysia. Indonesian 
paratroopers disguised as local volunteers landed in Labis and attacked Malaysian military 
personnel. They also crossed the Kalimantan border into Sarawak and supported the communist 
movement in Sarawak. Officially, this confrontation ended in 1966. For further elaboration on this 
topic, see Tarling, N, Nations and States in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 115.  
15 Although the Philippines never actively threatened the existence of Malaysia, this claim 
was primarily diplomatic. The Philippines wanted Sabah to be returned to them on the grounds 
that Sabah belonged to the Sultanate of Sulu and by virtue of the inclusion of Sulu into the 
Philippines, Sabah also belongs to them. See Tarling, 115 – 116.  
16 Singapore’s Chinese were uncomfortable with the new state that was politically dominated 
by ethnic Malays. They were also afraid that their economic wealth would move to Malaysia and 
they would get only a small portion, since a greater part of the population was in the peninsula of 
Malaysia. See Kingsbury, 275, and also Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996). 
17 Kingsbury, 276. 
18 Crouch, 24 – 27.  
4 
strengthened. Subsequently, the New Economy Policy was introduced by the 
government; it was aimed at addressing the Malay grievances about economic 
disparities.   
In 1977, the federal government again declared an emergency, this time in 
Kelantan, because the opposition party controlled the state assembly and 
planned to declare an Islamic state. The aim of the proclamation was to halt the 
spirit of radical Islam conveyed by the Parti Islam SeMalaysia (PAS).  
Prime Minister Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad stepped into the premier’s 
office on July 16, 1981, and headed the Malaysian government until Oct 31, 
2003--a period of 22 years. Malaysia was said to be moving towards 
authoritarianism under his regime, because Mahathir heavily suppressed civil 
and political rights to strengthen his political position and to preserve racial 
harmony.19 In 1987, he gave his approval to the police for the arrest, under the 
ISA, of 119 dissidents. Among those arrested were ten members of parliament 
from the Democratic Action Party (DAP), which is the Chinese opposition party, 
along with eight members of the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA), five 
members of Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (GERAKAN) and three members of the 
United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the ruling party.20 The mass arrest 
was called “Operation Lalang,” or the “Weeding Operation,”21 and was intended 
to constrain racial tensions. This operation also created a culture of fear among 
the population and also within Mahathir’s own UMNO party. 
                                            
19 For further elaboration of authoritarianism, see: Crouch, 107; Bridget Welsh, ed., 
Reflections: The Mahathir Years (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University, 2004), 3; and Karla 
Schneider, “Rhetoric, Reality and Prospect for Reform: Democracy and Human Rights in 
Malaysia,” (Master’s Thesis, Ohio University, August 2002), 46. 
20 Kingsbury, 279. 
21 The arrests of 119 activists for allegedly promoting ethnic tensions, illustrates the extent to 
which the government uses the ISA to restrain the oppositions. See: Bridget Welsh, “Malaysia: 
Security Begins at Home” in Asian Security Handbook: Terrorism and the New Security 
Environment, ed. William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek, 3rd Edition (New York: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2005), 166 – 179, William Case, “Semi Democracy in Mahathir’s Malaysia,” 77 – 86 and 
In-Won Hwang, “Malaysia’s “Presidential Premier”: Explaining Mahathir’s Dominance,” 67 - 76 in 
Bridget Welsh, ed. Reflections: The Mahathir Years, (Washington D.C.: John Hopkins University, 
2004). 
5 
The Supreme Court's 1987 declaration that UMNO was an illegal 
organization was a major setback for Mahathir and showed that while he 
increasingly dominated politics, some important elements remained outside of his 
control.22 One of these elements was the judiciary. Thus, in 1988, Mahathir 
sacked the responsible judges on the grounds of misconduct. He also amended 
the Constitution to curtail the judiciary’s power to check the executive. With this 
amendment, the judiciary lost its independence and came under executive 
control. 
Mahathir was known as one of the most vocal supporters of the idea of 
“Asian values.” He argued that human rights, as propounded in the West, are 
founded on individualism; they therefore have no relevance to Asian societies, 
which are based on the primacy of the community. He also suggested that “Asian 
values,” in which community rights always prevail over individual rights, should 
be a model for Malaysia.23 He argued that acknowledging civil and political rights 
would threaten internal security. 
The Anwar Ibrahim case of 1998 was the watershed of human rights 
issues in Malaysia. Anwar Ibrahim was a former Deputy Prime Minister who was 
arrested and charged with corruption and inappropriate sexual behavior.  
Descriptions of his case were published both locally and internationally. The 
government also used the ISA to legitimize the arrests of Anwar’s political 
associates--university students, opposition political party leaders, businessmen 
and others--who opposed Mahathir’s heavy-handed actions against critics. 
In addition, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) gave Mahathir’s 
government a valid excuse to use the ISA and other emergency laws to justify 
more human rights abuses in the form of political repression, mistreatment and 
torture. Mahathir used emergency laws such as the ISA, the OSA, the PPPA and  
 
                                            
22 Kingsbury, 280. 
23 For an elaborated discussion of "Asian values" see "'Asian values’ and Democracy in 
Asia," Proceedings of a conference held on 28 March 1997 at Hamamatsu, Shizuoka, Japan. 
Available at http://www.unu.edu/unupress/asian_values.htm; accessed 7 October 2005. 
6 
the Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance to curb his 
political enemies as well as terrorism. He instilled a culture of fear among the 
entire population.  
Faced with ongoing threats, the government of Malaysia has resorted to 
special legislation and constitutional amendments intended to increase its 
powers in dealing with crises and to further limit citizens’ rights and freedom. 
Relevant legislation includes the ISA of 1960, which allows for detention without 
trial. The PPPA, the Sedition Act and the OSA cover sensitive issues. The 
Societies Act and the Universities and University Colleges Act grant power to the 
Registrar of Societies to limit the modes of action and expression by NGOs. The 
Emergency (Public Order and Prevention of Crime) Ordinance and the Police Act 
curtail certain individual freedoms.24 Over time, these measures have led to 
violations of human rights in Malaysia that raise doubts among domestic and 
foreign observers (particularly during Mahathir's term in office) as to whether 
Malaysia has remained a democracy. 
B. RESEARCH SCOPE 
First, this study examines the reluctance of Mahathir to improve civil and 
political rights in Malaysia. The creation of the Malaysian Commission on Human 
Rights (Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia, or SUHAKAM) in 1999 seemed 
intended to improve human rights in Malaysia. However, because the 
commissioners were appointed and paid by the government for two years, and 
because the commissioners' tenure will be renewed or terminated by His Majesty 
on the advice of the Prime Minister, there is doubt about the Commission's 
independence and neutrality.25 Second, this study will demonstrate that the 
restriction of human rights produces an adversarial effect on internal security. 
 
                                            
24 Saliha Hassan and Carolina Lopez, “Human Rights in Malaysia: Globalization, National 
Governance and Local Response” in Francis Loh Kok Wah and Joakim Ojendal, ed. Southeast 
Asian Responses to Globalization: Restructuring Governance and Deepening Democracy (NiAS 
Press, 2003), 116. 
25 Ibid., 126. 
7 
The literature pertaining to human rights and their relationship to national 
security in Malaysia is vast. Most academic writers agree that human rights, 
specifically civil and political liberties, have been limited in Malaysia. Mahathir's 
control over Malaysia produced the most significant deterioration of human rights 
since the nation's inception.  
In 1999, Milne and Mauzy26 described how civil and political rights were 
under constraint because of the government's 1969 emergency proclamation. 
After the proclamation, the executive was given broad powers to enact laws that 
suspended most constitutional rights. The only way to revoke the emergency 
proclamation would have been through a vote in the Parliament. But since the 
ruling party controlled a two-thirds parliamentary majority, revocation was very 
unlikely. In fact, Mahathir regularly used the ISA to curb freedom of speech and 
the rights of assembly and association in order to preserve his political position 
and strengthen UMNO.   
Saravanamuthu,27 Tommy28 and Heufers29 agree that Mahathir, during 
his premiership, suppressed civil and political liberties on the grounds of national 
security. According to Saravanamuthu, Mahathir's continuing use of emergency 
legislation such as ISA in a non-emergency environment had a negative impact 
on the state of human rights in Malaysia.30 During his tenure in office, freedom of 
expression, freedom of speech, the freedoms of association and peaceful 
assembly, and the rights to fair trial and to counsel were restricted. In addition, 
the element of free and fair elections was absent, and participation in politics was 
limited.  
                                            
26 R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1999), 106. 
27 Johan Saravanamuthu, “Report on Human Rights in Malaysia: Regression or 
Progression”, Aliran Monthly. Database on-line. Available from http://aliran.com/hr/index.html; 
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For the same reasons, Tommy states that overdependence on emergency 
legislation by the government undermined human rights. In fact, he argues that 
over reliance on the emergency legislation might even have caused government 
brutality.31 He further explains that extreme dominance of the executive over the 
legislative and judiciary allowed Constitution articles unfavorable to the 
government to be amended without resistance. These amendments occurred 
because the weak opposition coalition did not have the opportunity to use the 
Parliament to check executive power.   
Heufers supports Saravanamuthu’s and Tommy’s arguments. He further 
expands on the topic by noting that the government’s control over the media,32 
legislative and judiciary infringes on human rights. This control created a culture 
of fear among the Malaysian people.33   
Additionally, Lee argues that the GWOT gave Mahathir legitimacy to act 
against his political opponents, suspected terrorist links, militant group members 
and religious deviationist groups.34 Mahathir used the ISA arbitrarily in the name 
of internal security. Lee suggests that a weak judicial system failed to safeguard 
individual liberty against the ISA and undermined human rights. 
According to Thompson, the state of human rights in Malaysia has been 
very much affected by the antiterrorism campaign.35 This campaign has actually 
been a bonus for authoritarianism in Malaysia, and Mahathir regarded the 
opposition politicians, who demanded greater democracy, as dangerous  
 
                                            
31 Tommy, 93.  
32 In April 1994, Malaysia expelled a Filipino news correspondent based in Kuala Lumpur on 
the grounds that she had written an article deemed a threat to national security. Leah Palma 
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33 Heufers, 45. 
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35 Mark R. Thompson, “Pacific Asia after `Asian values’: Authoritarian, democracy and good 
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terrorists.36 In the same vein, Ali notes that Mahathir arrested a dozen suspected 
militant Muslims, some of whom were linked with PAS, on the pretext that they 
were terrorists.37 
In a recent publication, Welsh argues that the domestic environment are 
the Malaysian security priority. In another words, the government put its effort to 
address internal security threat.38  She then specifies the four cornerstones of 
Malaysia’s internal security priorities, namely (1) economic strength, (2) ethnic 
harmony, (3) protecting Malay hegemony, and (4) Islamic challenges from PAS. 
It is indeed true that since independence, Malaysia has consistently used the 
emergency laws to squash groups that criticize or oppose government policies. 
Although the use of these laws has generally violated constitutional rights, 
protecting the ruling party remained the first priority of internal security.39  
On the other hand, human rights practices are believed to help strengthen 
national security, according to Christie and Roy.40 This argument is based on at 
least three points.41 First, maximizing the rights of citizens may increase their 
loyalty to the state. Thus, people are willing to make comparatively large scale 
sacrifices to defend the state when this becomes necessary.42 Second, 
promoting and protecting human rights may improve a country’s relative power 
(which is often the most common usage of the term “national security”) by 
speeding up its economic development. The free flow of information and the rule  
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of law, which are consequences of expanded civil and political liberties, facilitate 
innovation, efficiency and entrepreneurship.43 Finally, by promoting human rights 
abroad, a state may make itself more secure.  
One might ask: How will this argument fit into this study? The answer can 
be found by looking at how the state responds to potential and real threats to 
domestic security, how the preventive laws were used and the rationale used by 
the state to legitimize actions against its citizens.    
The gap in the literature is the lack of a comprehensive analysis of how 
the state of human rights affects internal security in Malaysia. Most studies focus 
either on the government's extensive use of emergency legislation to restrict 
rights, or on the relationship between democracy and human rights. Hence, to fill 
the gap, a study of the relationship between human rights and internal security is 
necessary. Since the scope of human rights issues is wide, this study focuses on 
civil and political rights in Malaysia. Several developments which undermined 
civil and political rights have occurred since independence in 1957. However, as 
previously mentioned, the period between 1981 and 2003 is the watershed of 
civil and political rights disputes in Malaysia. The government started to curb civil 
and political rights in 1981 on the grounds of preserving racial harmony. During 
Mahathir’s premiership, these rights were limited for a variety of reasons, 
including racial harmony, nation building, anti-communism, Asian values, and 
recently the GWOT. Therefore, this study focuses on how the human rights 
situation developed under Mahathir as Prime Minister.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a qualitative case study. Critical narrative analysis is 
conducted based on existing literature and information gathered from primary 
and secondary sources. An historical perspective is needed to examine how civil 
and political developed under Mahathir and how human rights issues have 
affected the nation’s stability. To examine the evolution and deterioration of 
human rights in Malaysia, the state of human rights within the period from 1957  
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to 2005 is described chronologically. This time period is divided into three 
phases: Phase One, from 1957 to 1980; Phase Two, from 1981 to 2003; and 
Phase Three, from 2004 to the present.  
This study analyzes primary and secondary sources on the human rights 
situation over the three time phases. Because Mahathir was one of the longest-
serving prime ministers, his policies, rules and regulations (which include policy, 
doctrine and procedures) are primary source information, and these sources are 
analyzed in this thesis. Much of this information is unavailable, however, due to 
the sensitivity or security classification of the information.  Therefore, only the 
source reference is cited. Reports from various sources, such as Human Rights 
Reports, Human Rights Watch, NGO reports, and academic literature on human 
rights, national security and terrorism are annotated. Additional sources include 
observation and critical analyses based on questionnaires (administered either 
through the internet or by telephone) with individuals who are well-versed on the 
subject. These sources allow the analysis to include the perceptions and views of 
representatives from human rights organizations about both current and future 
challenges.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II describes the political and economic situation in Malaysia from 
independence to the present (1957 – 2005). The purpose of this chapter is to 
give the reader important background information. To understand the framework 
of the problems, it is essential to analyze the connections between political and 
economic growth and human rights practices. The democratization issue is 
addressed first, followed by explanations of the New Economic Policy (NEP), the 
National Development Policy (NDP) and economic growth in Malaysia.  In 
addition, the chapter explains the cleavages and tensions among the races in 
Malaysia and the consequent limitation of civil and political liberties.    
Chapter III examines the human rights situation in Malaysia. This chapter 
is divided into three parts. The first part focuses on the human rights situation in 
Malaysia prior to the Mahathir era. The purpose of this section is to provide 
background. The second section examines the human rights situation under 
12 
Mahathir’s rule as Prime Minister. This part elaborates how the human rights 
situation changed from the day he stepped into office in 1981 until he stepped 
down in 2003. At the beginning of his tenure, Mahathir was more liberal 
regarding human rights issues.  But his attitude gradually changed, especially 
when his position was threatened. During his premiership, human rights were 
more suppressed. This chapter also examines the establishment of SUHAKAM. 
The analysis focuses on the roles, responsibilities and effectiveness of 
SUHAKAM. The third section examines the current human rights situation in 
Malaysia.  
Chapter IV examines the rhetoric and reality of rationalizing human rights 
restrictions. This chapter discusses each of the rationales that the government 
claimed legitimized its actions in suppressing human rights.  These rationales 
include anti-communism, racial harmony, Asian values, and terrorism. In the 
earlier stage of his premiership, Mahathir used anti-communism and racial 
harmony as excuses to suppress human rights in Malaysia. When the communist 
struggle ended in 1989, he used Asian values as an excuse. The September 11, 
2001 incident fundamentally transformed the Malaysian political landscape to 
favor Mahathir and the ruling government. September 11 and the fear of 
militancy among Islamic extremists gave Mahathir a valid excuse to continue   
suppressing human rights in Malaysia. This chapter analyzes the reasons behind 
the changing of these rationales and their effects on internal stability. 
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Chapter V focuses on the impact of rhetoric and the reality of human rights 
on internal security. It addresses the factors that affect internal security when 
human rights are only rhetorical. This chapter also proposes benefits to 
improving human rights and how human rights improvements may affect internal 
security. This chapter argues that if human rights standards were improved, the 
government would become more transparent and effective. This chapter also 
examines the relationship between human rights and internal security. The 
purpose of this examination is to analyze how human rights affect internal  
 
 
security. This chapter also assesses how far the civil and political liberties of 
citizens can be abridged by the government for the sake of protecting the state’s 
internal security.   
Finally, Chapter VI presents recommendations for addressing current 
human rights issues in Malaysia. These recommendations suggest how to 
improve the human rights situation while simultaneously promoting internal 
stability in the country.  
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II.  POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN MALAYSIA 
The success and impact of the distribution of wealth through the 
New Economic Policy is evident from the fact that racial riots have 
not occurred during the economic crisis. Malaysians of all races live 
peacefully and clearly have a sense of patriotism.44 
Prime Minister Dr. Mahathir Mohamad 
The main purpose of this chapter is to provide the historical background 
necessary to understanding the connections among politics, economic growth 
and human rights issues in Malaysia. Topics discussed in this chapter include the 
pluralistic nature of Malaysian society and its impact on the political system, and 
the evolution from consociationalism to a semi-democratic regime. This chapter 
will also examine the country's development from a colonial economy to the 
economy of a newly industrializing country (NIC).  Taking into account the two 
factors of political and economic development, this chapter explains the 
cleavages and tensions among the races in Malaysia and the subsequent 
limitations on civil and political liberties.   
A. MALAYSIA AS A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 
Malaysia is a federation of thirteen states and three federal territories 
directly administered by the federal government. Geographically, Malaysia is 
divided into two distinct areas by the South China Sea:  West Malaysia, also 
known as Peninsular Malaysia, and East Malaysia, which consists of Sabah and 
Sarawak. The two states of Sabah and Sarawak occupy the northeast part of the 
island of Borneo.    
The total Malaysian population, based on 2002 statistics, is approximately 
24 million.45 The majority is made up of Malays (51.9 percent) and the 
indigenous people known as “Bumiputera,” which literally means “son of the soil” 
(10.7 percent). The remaining population consists of Chinese (24 percent), 
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Indians (7 percent), “others” (1.1 percent) and noncitizens (5.3 percent).46 With 
its mixture of races, Malaysia exemplifies a multi-religious, multi-ethnic country.   
The Chinese and Indians migrated to Malaysia in the nineteenth century. 
They were brought in by the British to work in the tin mines and on the rubber 
plantations. Over time, the Chinese, who were concentrated in towns, came to 
control business and commerce in Malaysia, while most Indians remained 
employed on the rubber and later the palm oil plantations. The Malay were 
divided into two groups: administrators (including the military, police and civil 
service), and peasants and fishermen in the rural areas. In this respect, the 
British successfully practiced “divide and rule” in Malaysia.  The ethnic groups 
lived separately and engaged in different economic activities. Although the 
groups were segregated, ethnic peace and political stability prevailed. The secret 
of Malaysia's success in maintaining ethnic peace and political stability was that 
“Malaysia had a system of good governance that involved, beyond the trappings 
of parliament and elections, an independent judiciary, a reasonable tolerance of 
opposition, and a considerable, if not perfect, respect for the principles of rule of 
law.”47    
The roots of plural society in Malaysia can be traced from the British 
colonial era. As defined by Furnivall, “a plural society is a society that comprises 
two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without 
mingling in one political unit.”48 Furnivall argues that in the Malaysian context, the 
plural society effectively served the contemporary economic and political 
interests of British colonialism in Malaya. Because of Malaya's multi-ethnicity, 
economic, political and social issues were closely related to racial diversity. 
Furthermore, ethnic diversity became controversial whenever issues arose  
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involving ethnic rights, language, religion, poverty among minorities and nation-
building. As a result, ethnic cleavages were found at almost all levels and 
aspects of Malaysian life. As Mauzy correctly points out, 
These groups were divided by coinciding cleavages of races, 
language, religion, custom, area of residence and to a large extent, 
by type of occupation. Predictably, they lined up on the same 
opposing sides on every politically relevant issue.49  
To support Mauzy's argument, one Malaysian scholar, Dr. Zakaria Haji 
Ahmad, notes that “every political issue tends to be transformed into a communal 
one.”50 Hence, “Malaysian pluralism has no doubt [been] deemed to be a source 
of tension and conflict in the society.”51   
There are two incidents that caused tensions between ethnic groups in 
Malaysia: the First Emergency (1948 – 1960), and the race riot on May 13, 1969.   
The First Emergency was a consequence of the armed insurrection by 
communists (mainly Chinese), which threatened political and ethnic stabilities.52 
The communists’ main goal was to cripple the government, create political 
instability and destabilize the economy through radicalization and mobilization of 
the Chinese communities and the laborers in the rubber and tin industries.53 The 
Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) took advantage of the instability and tried to 
overthrow the government of Malaysia. The CPM mainly targeted the middle and 
lower classes in remote and rural areas. Most of the people who lived in these 
areas were Chinese and Malay. It was difficult to influence the Malay because of 
their strong religious beliefs, which contravened communist ideology. Moreover, 
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during the time, politics was dominated by the Malay. In its propaganda, the CPM 
took advantage of the differences between the races, including, for example, the 
Malays' political dominance and the perception of rural Chinese and Indian 
people as “second class citizens.”54  The CPM received support from the 
Peoples Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This support was provided 
through a third country, Indonesia, during the Sukarno period. 
The British reacted quickly to the communist threat. Under the “Briggs 
Plan,”55 the British cut off CPM influence by relocating squatters (mainly 
supporters and sympathizers of the CPM) from remote areas to well-organized 
villages. The plan was launched to resettle 500,000 villagers and squatters into 
new villages equipped with schools, clinics, safe water resources and extensive 
perimeter defenses. The British created the “Home Guard,” dominated by 
Chinese, to guard the new villages, further shrinking the support base of the 
CPM. The assimilation of the Chinese population into the Malay political 
mainstream increased the trust between the two races, and both groups 
combined to fight the communists.56 The government actions later revealed 
some successes as support for the communists declined. Faced with strong 
resistance from the Malays and the Chinese, the communists subsequently 
moved their operations to southern Thailand, after which, in 1960, the First 
Emergency ended.  
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The May 13, 1969 race riots also resulted from ethnic tensions between 
Malay and Chinese. The incident began with a campaign against unequal 
treatment of the Chinese and Indian minorities organized by the Democratic 
Action Party (DAP) and Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan). During the five-
week election campaign, the ruling Alliance57 elites failed to address frustration 
and antagonism that had developed over the previous few years among non-
Malays. The non-Malays were angered by  controversial issues like  “Malay 
special rights, the privileged position the Malays had in regard to employment, 
the four to one preponderance Malays enjoyed in the senior rank of the civil 
service and the barely concealed efforts that were being made to counter 
Chinese hegemony in commerce and industry.”58 Interracial friction seemed an 
inevitable result of racial insults which were embedded indiscriminately and 
irresponsibly by both the opposition parties and the Alliance. 
Consequently, interracial friction created widespread tensions and violent 
partisan clashes which at times threatened to become communal conflicts. The 
May 10, 1969 election was the third general election since independence. 
Election day itself was orderly. In the election, the ruling Alliance party remained 
in power but suffered severe losses.59 Out of 104 seats in the parliament, the 
Alliance party won 66, while opposition parties such as the DAP and Gerakan 
won 34 seats.60 Three ministers failed to retain their seats. DAP and Gerakan 
supporters marched in Kuala Lumpur to celebrate their victory. The Malay 
regarded this action as a challenge to their political supremacy. And during the 
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celebration, some of the Chinese and Indian participants rudely taunted Malay 
bystanders, causing fears of more aggressive ethnic group attacks.61  
In response, the Malay, mainly from UMNO, organized a procession that 
began at the Chief Minister’s residence in Kampong Baru, a large Malay 
settlement in the predominantly Chinese capital. Tension was high when the 
news broke out that Malay people had been attacked by Chinese on their way to 
Kampong Baru and several road blocks had been built by the Chinese to hinder 
the Malay from reaching the Chief Minister’s residence. Serious riots occurred 
only in Kuala Lumpur and Selangor; other parts of the country experienced little 
violence. The government declared a state of emergency and eventually 
suspended the parliament. A National Operative Council (NOC) was established 
and acted as caretaker of the nation. The May 13 Tragedy Report states, “Malay 
would-be participants [in the procession] . . . had been attacked . . . by Chinese 
groups . . . en route to Kampong Baru. It caused a violent anti-Chinese reaction 
and resulted in several deaths.”62 Overall, 196 people died and many shops and 
houses were destroyed.63  
Since that time, the issue of pluralism has haunted Malaysian politicians, 
policy makers and intellectuals. Whenever a policy debate arose, the racial issue 
interfered. Crouch rightly notes that “the spectre of a renewed outbreak of racial 
conflict continued to haunt the leaders of the government.”64 In the May 13 
Tragedy Report, an observer states: 
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The unwritten law regarding communal issues was violated by the 
both Alliance and Opposition parties when they indulged in open 
public and heated debate over such subjects. Malay and Chinese 
emotions were rubbed raw and came dangerously close to 
breaking point. Although the campaign went off without incident, 
there was a distinct feeling of tension as polling day approached.65  
The effect of the May 13 race riots was to create an impression that 
sensitive issues should not be discussed publicly, even in the parliament. Such 
sensitive issues included “the power and status of the Malay rulers, Malay’s 
special privileges, citizenship, Malay as the national language and the status of 
Islam as the official religion.”66 The rationales behind the avoidance of explicit 
discussion of sensitive issues are “to allow the smooth functioning of 
parliamentary democracy: and to redress the racial imbalance in certain sectors 
of the nation’s life and thereby promote national unity.”67 In addition, a new 
sedition law was introduced, and with it, freedom of speech, assembly and press 
were curtailed. 
B. MALAYSIA POLITICS: FROM CONSOCIATIONALISM TO SEMI- 
DEMOCRACY  
One of the major problems in a democracy is protecting the rights and 
interests of minorities. If political parties are built along racial lines or tend to 
champion certain racial groups’ interests, the probability of racial clashes is 
higher. The First Emergency and the 1969 race riots were caused by ethnic 
dissatisfaction. These incidents, and especially the race riots, significantly 
changed the Malaysian political landscape.    
In the effort to gain independence, the political elites did not emphasize 
racial and ethnic differences. The political parties were formed along ethnic lines. 
Each party struggled for its community's agenda. For example, the Malaysia  
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Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malaysia Indian Association (MIC) promoted 
equal rights for all Malaysians. Those parties also wanted Chinese and Tamil to 
be official languages of Malaysia.  
During the first election in 1955, however, three political parties--UMNO, 
MCA and MIC--joined to form the Alliance Party. The Alliance Party was based 
on mutual understanding, trust and compromise among the three party leaders. 
The MCA and MIC leaders agreed to acknowledge several points, such as Islam 
as an official religion, Malay as the national language, and special privileges and 
rights for the Malay as Bumiputera or indigenous people. In return, the non-
Malays were awarded citizenship by jus soli (citizenship by birth) and were free 
to practice their own religions, languages, and cultures and to acquire wealth and 
property.68 In essence, the non-Malays were given the concession of citizenship, 
while the Malays kept their special position for an indefinite period of time. With 
this “special package deal,” the Alliance Party won 51 of 52 seats in the 
Legislative Council. This consociational approach made the British confident of 
the Alliance Party; they believed its approach might work. Two years later, the 
British gave independence to Malaysia. The UMNO, MCA and MIC subsequently 
shared power in a coalition government until 1969. Although the power was not 
equal, the consociational system worked until 1969.   
The government-institutionalized consociational system with Malay 
hegemony coincides with the consociationalism concept developed by Arend 
Lijphart.69 Lijphart, Musolf and Springer define consociationalism as “a process 
of relatively autonomous bargaining and compromise within a coalition of elite 
leadership representing the various communal groups.”70 This concept works 
“through the mechanism of group autonomy, proportional representation, politics 
of compromise and consensus, a coalition government and veto power on 
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decisions vital to group interests.”71 Each party has to tackle its own community's 
problems, protect its community from extremist elements and formulate 
communal demand within permitted parameters. It was hoped that racial 
harmony and balance would be preserved with this practice. 
After the 1969 race riots, Malaysia’s leaders realized that the 
consociational approach did not work for the country. With this recognition, the 
government made drastic reforms to the political sphere aimed at preserving 
racial harmony and political stability. These reforms included restrictions on the 
civil and political rights of citizens. Human rights were curbed because the 
restrictions were deemed necessary to end ethnic friction and political instability.  
In 1970, Malaysia was said to have moved toward a semi-democracy. As 
defined by Diamond, Linz and Lipset, semi-democracy is a state where 
. . . the effective power of the elected officials is so limited, or 
political party competition so restricted, or the freedom and fairness 
of elections so compromised that electoral outcomes, while 
competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences; 
and/or where civil and political liberties are so limited that some 
political orientations and interests are unable to organize and 
express themselves.72  
For example, Malaysia permitted the emergence of opposition parties to 
form a coalition. Malaysia also permitted professionals and laborers to form 
professional associations and labor organizations. On the other hand, the 
government used the Societies Act to restrict the activities of the professional 
associations and labor organizations.  Similarly, university students’ activities 
were circumscribed by the University and University Colleges Act, which 
prohibited students from joining or demonstrating support for a political party. 
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As specified in Part II of the Federal Constitution, Malaysia has conducted 
elections every five years; the last election was in March 2004. The election was 
carried out according to the procedures stipulated in the Election Act. However, 
the ruling party uses all government mechanisms (such as the media, the 
bureaucracies and development grants) to ensure that the opposition’s parties do 
not have a fair chance to compete.73 While opposition parties are free to contest 
the election, they will be denied a two-thirds majority in the parliament or in the 
state assembly by the strict rules and regulations imposed on the opposition 
parties. The government may shorten the campaign periods for the opposition. 
Their communications and funding activities may be curbed, and “some of their 
constituencies may be disenfranchised.”74 The opposition parties have neither 
the facilities nor the amenities to convey their manifestos or visions.  
These controls do not prevent opposition parties from contesting elections, 
but they do contribute to a situation in which, as William Case notes, "though 
opposition parties can gain entry to Malaysia’s parliament, they are prevented 
from winning the majorities necessary to control it."75 In essence, there is 
imbalance and inequality between the ruling party and the opposition parties in 
the Malaysian election process. In support of this observation, Crouch comments 
in his book, Malaysian Government: Authoritarian Repression and Democratic 
Responsiveness, “the Malaysian electoral system . . . [has been] so heavily 
loaded in favor of the government that it is hard to imagine that [it] . . . could be 
defeated in an election.”76       
The late Tun Abdul Razak, then Prime Minister, commented on the need 
for a type of democracy which fulfills the Malaysian society’s needs. He stated 
that: 
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The Malaysian type of democracy is best suited to the needs of the 
country’s unique multi racial society. The Malaysian concept of 
democracy subscribes also the need to balance individual interests 
against the general security of the State. The view we take is that 
democratic government is the best and most acceptable form of 
government. . . . We recognize that each nation must develop . . . 
its own chosen political and economic system and that the 
developing world has a special need of an articulated political 
system suitable to its own problem.77  
The departure from consociationalism in the early 1970 to semi-
democracy was a deliberate move by Malaysia’s government. In fact, Mahathir 
had considered whether the Westminster model, which was adopted, was 
suitable in the Malaysian context. His argument:  
Several years after independence, we were so happy with our 
newfound freedom that our leaders failed to hear the grievances or 
notice the undercurrent of racial imbalance in the country in 
political, economic and social affairs.78 
C. NEW ECONOMIC POLICY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: FROM 
COLONIAL ECONOMY TO NEWLY INDUSTRIAL COUNTRY 
Malaysia is among the third world countries that have experienced 
extraordinary economic and social changes during the last three decades.79 It 
began with a series of development plans that enabled the government to check 
how closely implementation conformed to planning, thus making it easy to see 
what revisions were necessary for future plans. During the last three decades, 
the government has implemented a New Economy Policy (NEP), followed by the 
National Development Policy (NDP) and National Vision (NVP). Malaysia’s 
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Table 1.   Malaysia’s Development Planning Framework (From: Malaysia: 




1971 – 1990 1991 – 2000 2001 – 2010 
New Economy Policy (NEP) 
 
Outline Perspective Plan 1 
National Development 
Policy (NDP) 
Outline Perspective Plan 2 
National Vision Policy (NVP) 
 
Outline Perspective Plan 3 
Second Malaysia Plan 
(1971 – 1975) to Fifth 
Malaysia Plan (1986 – 
1990) 
Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991 – 
1995) and Seventh 
Malaysia Plan (1996 – 
2000) 
Eighth Malaysia Plan (2001 – 
2005) 
 
1. The Colonial Economy Era 
The British occupation of Malaysia began in 1786 with Sir Francis Light's 
invasion of Penang Island. As time went on, the British gradually encroached 
inland. Their initial aim was to control the sea route from India to China through 
the Straits of Malacca.80 Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, the British 
exploited the raw resources (especially from the inland states) needed to feed 
the industrial countries of the West. In order to ship these commodities  to the 
West, the British developed railways and ports, mostly on the west coast of 
Peninsular Malaysia. 
During the British colonial era, tin and rubber were the main exports of 
Malaya. Initially, tin had been mined in small quantities and was owned by the 
Sultans (the Malay rulers) and the Malay chiefs.  As a result of great world 
demand for tin, the influx of Chinese immigrants and the establishment of Straits 
Settlement, the Sultans and the Malay chiefs slowly lost their ownership of the tin 
mines to the British.81 Meanwhile, rubber plantations were introduced by the 
Europeans in the early 1900s; these were totally controlled by European 
businessmen. With the evolution of the American automobile industry, the 
demand for rubber increased tremendously. By 1920, Malaya exported about 51 
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percent of the world’s total rubber supply.82 During that time, “Malaya was the 
most successful exemplary of what has been called the colonial export 
economy.”83 In the colonial export economy, immigrants were exploited for the 
economic advantages of the colonial master. The Malays, on the other hand, 
continued with their daily routines and activities and their traditional style of rural 
life without interference from the government. The Malay people were involved in 
the agriculture sector, working as rice growers and peasants and the like.  They 
were not actively involved in the tin mining and rubber plantations. In other 
words, the Malays were segregated from the British economic sectors. Although 
the economy had developed overall, there were three fundamental imbalances:   
in the sectoral economic structure, in regional development and in personal 
income distribution.  
The world depression affected Malaya’s economy. In 1932, when the 
world prices of rubber and tin declined sharply, the British government took 
several steps to diversify the economy. The British focused on the agriculture 
sector in order to stabilize the economy. Making the situation worse was the 
Japanese occupation in 1942, which created economic instability and general 
uncertainty. Tensions among the races rose due to economic devastation and 
the longstanding distrust between the Malay and the Chinese.  
After World War II, the British came back to Malaya and faced an armed 
communist insurrection. In 1948, the CPM started their campaign to gain support 
from workers and laborers. The campaign coincided with its main objective--to 
disrupt the Malayan economy. The economy was “booming” due to the Korean 
War, which “generated large balance of payments surpluses in 1950 and 
1951.”84  Because the Malayan economy at that time was in good condition and 
benefited all ethnic groups, the communists failed in their bid to attract worker 
groups to the insurrection. 
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One could say that the economic situation during the colonial era was over 
reliance on two main natural resources, tin and rubber. There was not much 
export diversification, and income was very much dependent on European 
demand for these two commodities. 
The west coast of Peninsular Malaysia was better developed than the east 
coast. Trade, commerce and the development of infrastructure was concentrated 
on the west coast; this created disparity in regional development.85  
The focus given to the tin and rubber export sector resulted a great influx 
of Chinese and Indian immigrant labor. The Chinese later established 
themselves as traders and concentrated in the urban areas, while the Malay 
maintained their rural lifestyles as rice growers and peasants. The Indians 
worked as laborers on the rubber plantations and lived in rural areas with poor 
prospects.86 
Compared to the Chinese and Indians, poor education, unemployment 
and rural living led to more widespread poverty among the Malay. There was little 
cooperation and interaction among the races. The government maintained a 
laissez-faire ("leave it alone") policy on ethnic issues and played less and less of 
a role in stabilizing the economic disparities between the Malays and the non-
Malays.87  
2. Economic Growth and Transformation from 1957 to 1969 
Between 1957 and 1969, Malaysia continued to earn its income mainly 
from tin and rubber exports. The average annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate was 6.4 percent.88 To enhance the welfare of the Malay and to spur 
economic growth, the government considered diversifying its exports from tin and 
rubber to palm oil and cocoa. At the same time, the government actively 
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promoted industrialization and started to attract foreign companies to invest in 
Malaysia. In 1957, the government introduced the first industrial scheme, the 
Pioneer Industries Scheme (PIS).89 This scheme provided member companies 
with favorable tax treatments and incentives. Additionally, through this scheme 
the government imposed specific employment policies, such as employment 
quotas, to protect the Malays' job security. Quotas allowed companies to receive 
PIS status.90 In other words, the government made employment quotas a 
precondition for a company to receive PIS recognition. However, this scheme 
was not effective in reducing the unemployment and poverty problems.91  
The government subsequently doubled its effort to promote import-
substituting industries (ISI).92 The ISI was used to attract foreign capital 
investment to stimulate the Malaysian economy. It reflected efforts to diversify 
the economy by moving from agriculture to industry. The foreign companies 
established subsidiaries for “assembling, finishing and packaging goods 
produced with imported materials.”93 The government’s policies resulted in the 
growth of the GDP from 9 percent in 1960 to 13 percent in 1970 in the ISI 
manufacturing sector. Similarly, manufacturing employment grew from 6.4 
percent of total employment in 1957 to 11.4 percent in 1970. Despite the ISI 
manufacturing sector’s growth, however, the ISI scheme did not significantly 
reduce unemployment and poverty problems in Malaysia. In fact, the ISI 
industries had a weak link to the domestic economy. This weak link contributed 
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to the “domestic market saturation” and the manufacturing sector's contribution to 
GDP stagnation (around 9 percent in 1960 and 1964).94   
Because of economic stagnation and higher unemployment rates, income 
inequalities increased among the ethnic Malay. Consequently, poverty remained 
widespread. In 1967, during an interview with the New Zealand Broadcasting 
Corporation, Deputy Prime Minister, Razak acknowledged the imbalance 
developing in Malaysian society.  He said: 
It is true at the moment that political power is in the hands of the 
Malays and economic power in the hands of the Chinese. That is 
why we must try and balance things out. That is why we are doing 
our best to try and give the Malays a little bit of share in the 
economic life to enable them to feel safe in the country. After all 
they were the original settlers.95 
These economic problems resulted in the reduction of support to the 
Alliance party in the 1969 general election and eventually led to the 1969 race 
riots.96 
3. New Economic Policy (1970 – 1990) 
A major cause of the race riots was “economic disparities between the 
racial groups in the country.”97 To redress this underlying problem, the 
government in 1970 introduced a 20 year plan, the New Economic Policy (NEP). 
The plan began with three major objectives:  to eradicate poverty irrespective of 
race or ethnicity, to restructure Malaysian society to correct economic 
imbalances by removing racial identification with economic function, and to 
maintain a growing economy. In addition, the NEP was to promote equity in 
conjunction with national unity among the races. The Malaysian government  
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realized that national unity is the prerequisite for continuing economic progress 
and the NEP planned to narrow the economic gap between the Malays and non-
Malays to reduce ethnic prejudices.  
In 1970, the majority of the population lived in rural areas. Of the total 
population, 85.1 percent of Malays lived in rural areas, along with 65.3 percent of 
Indians and 52.6 percent of Chinese.  These figures clearly show that the Malays 
were mostly isolated from modernization.98   
 
Table 2.   Division of Races by Percentage in 1970. (From: F. R Von Der 
Mehden, “Communalism, Industrial Policy and Income Distribution in 
Malaysia,” Asian Survey, Vol. 15, No. 3, 247 – 261 (March 1975): 248) 
 
Race Urban Rural 
Malay 14.9 85.1 
Chinese 47.4 52.6 
Indian 34.7 65.3 
Others 40.8 59.2 
Total 28.7 71.3 
 
Implemented in 1971, the NEP was divided into five-year periods known 
as the Second through Fifth Malaysia Plans.99 To control these five-year plans, 
the government implemented the Outline Perspective Plan (OPP). Under the 
OPP, the government drafted the expectation of the plan over 20 years.  
Emphasis was on the following goals: (1) improving the living conditions in rural 
areas (dominated by Malays), (2) making education accessible to the lower 
classes, (3) providing more skilled job opportunities, and (4) reducing the income 
gap between the ethnic groups.100  To achieve these goals, the government 
formulated a 30:40:30 formulas. By 1990, in all industries and commercial 
activities set up by the government, 30 percent of the share is for the Malays, 40 
percent for other races, and the remaining 30 percent for international 
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investors.101 The policymakers established long term targets for Malay ownership 
of share capital in limited companies and for the proportion of Malays employed 
in modern sectors (manufacturing, mining, commerce, industry and 
transportation), enrolled in institutions of higher learning and installed in 
managerial positions.      
Between 1970 and 1990, the NEP succeeded in several respects. First, 
there has been no ethnic unrest in Malaysia since the NEP was implemented. 
The various ethnic groups have lived in harmony and the socioeconomic 
condition for all the races has improved.  
Second, during the NEP period, all ethnic groups experienced economic 
growth. Malaysia experienced an average 3.75 percent per year growth in per 
capita income from 1970 to 1990; this benefited all races. For instance, the 
Malay experienced a 5.97 percent per capita increase, the Chinese, a 3.46 
percent increase and the Indians, a 1.35 percent increase in per capita income.  
Third, the NEP reduced the poverty rate from 49.3 percent in 1970 to 16.5 
percent in 1990.102 Gomez and Jomo correctly point out that in the Bumiputera 
communities, poverty was reduced from 64.8 percent in 1970 to 20.8 percent in 
1990.103 This result is a vital inspiration for the government to continue with its 
policy goal of completely eradicating poverty.  
Fourth, Malay ownership of private sector increased. At the end of 1990, 
Malay ownership had grown from 2.4 percent in 1980 to 19.3 percent.104  One 
might say that the NEP succeeded in creating a new class of Bumiputera 
entrepreneurs and businessmen.105  
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Finally, the level of education of the Malay population improved. To 
achieve this, Malays were given scholarships and preferences to enter 
universities and colleges. Some of them were excellent at their studies and 
achieved good results. Rural Malays also were able to go to university, locally or 
abroad. The former Finance Minister, Daim Zainuddin, pointed out that 
“education was our best investment. Education remains the key factor in any 
attempt to restructure society.”106   
4. New Development Policy (1991-2000)  
In 1991, having examined the successes and shortfalls of the First Outline 
Perspective Plan and the report of the National Economic Consultative Council, 
Mahathir's government introduced the New Development Policy (NDP) to replace 
the NEP. With this new policy, the government aimed at an average growth rate 
of 7 percent for the years 1991 through 2000.  
The objective of NDP was to attain balanced development to create a 
more united and just society. The NDP was based on the NEP objectives of 
eradicating poverty and restructuring society and continued the strategy of 
growth with equity. It encompassed, among other points, the need to strike an 
optimum balance between growth and equity, to ensure balanced development 
of major sectors to insure responsiveness, and to emphasize science, technology 
and human resources for the entire population as a prerequisite for meeting the 
challenges of an industrial society.107  
To achieve these objectives, three working plans were developed:  the 
Sixth Malaysia Plan (1991 – 1995), the Second Outline Plan (OPP2), and Vision 
2020. These three working plans proved to be a turning point in Malaysia’s 
economic development during the recession of the mid-1980s. Unlike the NEP, 
which attracted the Bumiputera to first enter into in business and commerce, the 
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NDP intended to retain and educate them in commercial enterprises. To increase 
meaningful participation of the Bumiputera in the modern economy, the 
Bumiputera Commercial and Industrial Community (BCIC) was created. Poverty 
decreased to 7.5 percent in 1999, although the Bumiputera equity decreased to 
18.9 percent in 2000.108 The focus of NDP's objectives and plans shifted from 
redistribution to growth. 
Another change to the NDP involved a shift from nationalization of 
business and industry to privatization. This shift occurred because of the national 
corporations' poor performance.109 According to Sundaram, “the privatization 
concept was to reduce government responsibility to provide financial and 
administrative support to industries, promoting competition and entrepreneurship, 
reducing the size of the public sectors that had become prone to monopolies and 
political polarization, and introducing the Bumiputera business to private 
enterprise.”110  Hence, the private sectors remained the growth engine in the 
1990s, with the public sector playing a supportive and complementary role. The 
successful implementation of privatization depends on incorporating private 
sector participation and the idea that the fate of individual private industries 
should be determined by market forces. Economic well being would, of course, 
bring greater prosperity to the population; together with its aim of national unity, 
strengthen the state and increase internal stability. 
5. National Vision Policy (2001 – 2010) 
Vision 2020 was formulated by Mahathir as Prime Minister.  This personal 
vision has been accepted by the population as a national vision of what Malaysia 
should look like in the year 2020. It also provides the challenge that will have to  
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be overcome to make Vision 2020 a reality. The vision sets new and higher 
objectives as national aspirations. It changes “the way Malaysians see 
themselves and the direction of their shared destiny.”111  
The main goal of Vision 2020 is to increase Malaysia's productivity and 
competitiveness. In the last 30 years, the Malaysian economy has transformed 
from primary to industrial production. However, there has been very little focus on 
research and development (R & D). With the Vision, the Malaysian economy has 
been opened to foreign investors who, together with their technology, are 
encouraged to invest in electronics production supported by “the local workforce, 
good infrastructure, good industrial incentives, conduciveness to business 
environment and politically stability.”112 This mutual support will enable Malaysia 
to enjoy rapid economic growth. Local companies will remain profitable because 
they will deliver products and services that consumer’s desire and demand.113 As 
attention is focused on R & D and technology, the government intends to expand 
its manufacturing and services sectors. Thus Malaysia will become one of the 
newly industrializing countries (NIC) like Japan and South Korea. Foreign 
investors are encouraged to invest in Malaysia's “export-orientated industries” 
and “public sector’s privatization.” 
In addition, Vision 2020 calls for total development. Hence, it requires that 
the government accept it as a public policy. The government has highlighted the 
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By the year 2020, Malaysia can be united nation, with a confident 
Malaysian society, infused by strong moral and ethical values . . . a 
society that is democratic, liberal, tolerant, and caring, economically 
just and equitable, progressive and prosperous and in full 
possession of an economy that is competitive, dynamic, robust and 
resilient.114 
It is worth noting that Vision 2020 is similar to the NEP and the NDP in its 
core components. However, it provides better perspectives on the strategies for 
achieving its objectives. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The integration of the Malay, the Chinese and the Indians into the nation-
state of Malaysia has made it a plural society. This pluralism has always been a 
source of ethnic tensions and political instabilities, as evidenced by the First 
Emergency and the 1969 race riots. In fact, the government reaction to the race 
riots significantly changed the Malaysian political landscape from 
consociationalism to semi-democracy. As a semi-democratic nation, Malaysia 
practices regular elections but at the same time restricts civil and political 
liberties. It can be said that the race riots in 1969 were the turning point in the 
development of human rights in Malaysia.  
During the colonial era, Malaya inherited a one-sided economy, huge 
regional disparities, and the separation of economical and political power. 
Immigrants were exploited for the benefit of the colonial masters. Although the 
economy was in a good condition, economic imbalance, poverty and isolation 
from modernization existed among the ethnic groups in Malaya until 
independence in 1957. After independence, the main focus was on achieving 
national unity and territorial integrity. The economic policy during that time was 
based on the laissez-faire.  There were few efforts to close economic gaps 
between the Malays and the non-Malays. Between 1957 and 1969, the 
government diversified the rubber and tin export economy to include cocoa and  
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palm oil. At the same time, the government promoted schemes for 
industrialization.  The PSI and later the ISI aimed to transform exports from 
agriculture to industrial products.  
Learning from the 1969 race riots, the government introduced the NEP. 
This 20 year plan succeeded in reducing poverty among the ethnic groups and 
guided Malaysia to rapid economic growth. When the NEP expired in 1990, the 
government introduced the NDP. This policy was aimed at balanced 
development to establish a more united and just society.  The NDP was also 
intended to strike an optimum balance between economic growth and equity 
goals. Between 1991 and 2000, Malaysia achieved the unprecedented average 
economic growth rate of 8.9 percent. This has led to public support for the 
government to continue with its development policy.  
The NVP has driven Malaysia to the NIC. Under the NIC, the 
manufacturing and services sectors are expanded. Malaysia also emphases 
science and technology, R & D, and education and training, so that skilled human 
resources from local companies will be ready to compete in the market and meet 
the needs of foreign investors. All these development policies are aimed at 
national unity.  Mahathir, in particular, wanted all races to be fully united and to 
contribute to the development of the country. The bitter memories of the 1969 
race riots were a good lesson for Malaysians, demonstrating that the government 
will take measures to preserve racial harmony and political stability even though 
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III.  HUMAN RIGHTS IN MALAYSIA BEFORE, DURING AND 
AFTER MAHATHIR'S GOVERNMENT  
Human rights are the foundation of human existence and 
coexistence. Human rights are universal, indivisible and 
independent. Human rights are what make us human. They are the 
principles by which we create the sacred home for human 
dignity.115 
Kofi Annan 
This chapter examines the human rights situation in Malaysia. Mahathir 
argued that restrictions on human rights were necessary to maintain internal 
security. There is an ongoing argument between the state and human rights 
activists in which the former argues that the economy and social rights should 
take priority over civil and political rights, while the latter argue that human rights 
should be universal and liberal according to the UDHR. Such conflicting views 
make the human rights situation in Malaysia interesting to analyze.  It is 
worthwhile to examine the situation in Malaysia before, during and after the 
period of Mahathir's administration. Accordingly, this chapter considers human 
rights divided into three periods: prior to Mahathir’s rule (1957–1981), during 
Mahathir’s rule (1981–2003), and after Mahathir’s rule (2004 to present).  
A.  HUMAN RIGHTS 
In general, human rights are grouped into four categories:  civil, political, 
social and economic rights. The main focus of this chapter is on the first two 
categories, civil and political rights. The table below illustrates the internationally 
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Table 3.   Internationally Recognized Civil and Political Rights (From: Jack Donnelly, 
International Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), 
6). 
 
Civil Rights Political Rights 
Self-determination Rights to vote 
Access to legal remedies for rights 
violations  
Political participation 
Equality of rights without discrimination Rights to fair and free elections 
Protection from arbitrary arrest and 
detention 
Rights to compete for public 
office 
Freedom of opinion, expression and the 
press 
Hearing before an independent 
and impartial judiciary 
Freedom of assembly and association Free trade unions 
Freedom of thought, conscience, and 
religion 
 
Liberty and security of person  
Protection against ex post facto laws  
Freedom of movement and residence  
 
As noted above, the UDHR, because it lays down the basic institutional 
structure for the protection of human rights, stands as both a foundation and a 
symbol of great importance.116 Since its promulgation in 1948, the UDHR has 
been used as a model for many subsequent human rights charters.  The UDHR 
was originally derived from the English Magna Carta of 1215, the U.S. Bill of 
Rights of 1791 and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 
1789.117 The purpose of the UN declaration is to promote respect for the whole 
array of human rights, ranging from civil and political rights to economic, social 
and cultural rights, addressed in the thirty articles of the UDHR.118  In addition to 
the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was 
formulated in 1976 to protect the individual from the states. In fact, the ICCPR 
put Articles 2 through 21 of the UDHR into action; this convention can be 
considered the first generation of human rights declarations. The same year saw 
the birth of the second generation of human rights declaration in the form of the 
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). As 
Eldridge put it, “both conventions are fundamental to human dignity and were 
never intended to be separated.”119  
Prior to Malaysia's independence, the Reid Commission,120 which drafted 
the Federal Constitution, made observations and recommendations regarding 
provisions for human rights. Because the Constitution was to be the highest law 
in the land,121 its human rights recommendations were accepted by the 
government, and the rights described in the provisions were termed fundamental 
liberties and enshrined in Part II of the Constitution.122 The Reid Commission 
stated that 
These concepts (fundamental rights in the Constitution) must be 
guaranteed by the Constitution and this is entrenched by the 
guarantee afforded to the Constitution as a supreme law which 
includes the power and duty of the courts to enforce these rights 
and to annul any attempt to subvert any of them by the legislative 
or administrative action or otherwise.123  
The Constitution, with the human rights provisions embedded in it, 
became the foundation for human rights practice in Malaysia. In fact, the 
provisions of the UDHR are broadly covered in the Constitution. Besides civil and 
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political rights, other rights in the Constitution include periodic elections124 and 
the independence of the judiciary.125 However, under Article 149 and Article 150 
of the federal Constitution, power is given to the Parliament to enact any law 
aimed at combating “subversion” or any threats prejudicial to national security, 
even if the law is inconsistent with the protection embodied in Part II of the 
Constitution. Hence, these two constitutional provisions permitted the birth of the 
Internal Security Act (ISA). The ISA was introduced in 1960; it allows the police 
to detain “suspects” without trial. This was always the main point of contention 
between the fundamental rights described in Part II of the Constitution and 
Articles 149 and 150, which permitted the restriction of fundamental rights. On 
one hand, the Constitution guarantees fundamental rights for citizens; on the 
other hand, it limits those fundamental rights.   
B. HUMAN RIGHTS PRIOR TO MAHATHIR’S RULE  
Because of rising communist violence in 1948, the British delayed 
Malaysia's independence until 1957. After independence was obtained on August 
31, Malaysia faced threats not only from the communists, but also from external 
sources including Indonesia (confrontation between 1963 and 1966), the 
Philippines (the claim on Sabah in 1962), and Singapore (secession in 1965). 
Moreover, ethnic tensions grew over time. All of these threats contributed to 
undermining human rights standards in Malaysia. The human rights situation 
initially developed under Malaysia's first three prime ministers. 
1. Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957 – 1970) 
The human rights situation under Tunku was generally liberal, even 
though he occasionally used the ISA and the Societies Act to intimidate his 
political opposition. In significant ways, however, he usually respected civil 
liberties. During his terms in office, the opposition parties could organize public 
rallies to present their manifestos to the voters and could freely sell their 
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newspapers to the general public. The “Malaysian Malaysia”126 campaign 
promoted by Lee Kuan Yew illustrates Tunku’s liberalism on human rights 
practice. In 1964, Lee in Singapore tried to establish a foothold in Peninsular 
Malaysia’s politics. This challenged the Malaysian Chinese loyalty to the 
Malaysia Chinese Association (MCA). As a result, Lee’s action divided the MCA 
into factions. Besides challenging and dividing the Chinese in Peninsular 
Malaysia, the “Malaysian Malaysia” campaign was implicitly perceived as an 
attack on Malay special rights.127 Surprisingly, the Tunku did not take any action 
against Lee. A similar outcome occurred when Mahathir sent an inflammatory 
letter to Tunku. In fact, Mahathir published a book, The Malay Dilemma, which 
criticized Tunku and the Malays.128 In an interview with Barraclough in 1980, 
Tunku said, “If I had taken repressive action, I would perhaps regret one day 
having done so. As I explained to Parliament, this alternative of repression went 
very much against my feeling and conscience.”129 Further, Tunku said that it 
would be morally wrong to use his power to silence the opposition leaders in 
Parliament by threats of coercion because he believed that they, too, had a duty 
to perform. 
If Tunku was right, then the detention of opposition parties’ members was 
unconstitutional and acts of mala fide (bad faith). In reality, Tunku had ordered 
the police to arrest and detain, under provisions of the ISA, a number of radical 
Malay opposition leaders including Ahmad Boestaman (President of Parti 
Rakyat), Dr. Burhannudin (the leader of PAS), Aziz Ishak (President of National 
Convention Party) and Labor Party members. This mass detention was intended 
bility to achieve success in the election. According to to restrict the opposition's a
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Dr. Kua Kia Soong, “In 1963, just before the 1964 general elections, there were a 
total of 1,052 cases of ISA detention.”130 In addition to opposition party members, 
detainees under the ISA were alleged to be involved in communist activities, 
supporting the Indonesia confrontation campaign against Malaysia or actively 
involved in trade union activities.131 
Tunku also used the Societies Act as a threat to de-register any 
organization that was perceived as having been infiltrated by communists. As 
usual, this threat was directed against the opposition parties. For example, in 
1964, the Labor Party and the PSRM were threatened with de-registration, which 
did eventually take place in 1972. Another party, the DAP, was nearly de-
registered after failing to submit statements of income.  
Under the leadership of Tunku, Malaysia suffered from growing ethnic 
tensions between the Malay and other ethnic minorities. At the same time, there 
was factional infighting within UMNO between the “old guard” and the “young 
Turks.” All of these problems affected civil and political rights in Malaysia. In fact, 
from 1957 to 1969, the government amended the Federal Constitution three 
dozen times with the aim of transferring more power to the executive and thus 
limiting human rights provisions. These amendments also gave birth to more 
repressive legislation, such as the Official Secrets Act and the Sedition Act. 
As mentioned above, the human rights situation under Tunku seemed 
liberalized and relaxed regarding Lee and Mahathir. On one hand, Tunku   
seemed to be lenient toward Lee and Mahathir, but on the other hand, he 
seemed to harsh with the opposition political parties. The retention of the ISA 
was justified as part of the fight against the communist insurgency and later to 
preserve racial harmony. However, in some circumstances the ISA was used for 
reasons other than communist suppression, such as to “block political challenges 
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and intimidate critics.”132 The government's use of the ISA was not overseen by 
any other agency or organization. Thus it was left to the whim and fancy of the 
prime minister when and how to use the ISA. This phenomenon was difficult to 
explain. But to the prime minister, the most important issue was the unity of the 
Malays.133 In reality, the power struggle among the UMNO elites, as well as the 
Malay's dissatisfaction with Tunku, led to the factionalism in UMNO and some of 
its elites' desire to gain power for themselves.  
It is difficult to say that during Tunku’s period human rights were abused or 
eroded because at the time, political leaders did not show any political interest in 
human rights issues. National and economic development was more important 
and replaced “commitment to values,” which was more suited to the “solidarity-
building” post-independent period.  
On the grassroots level, the ethnic tension between the Chinese and 
Indian minorities and the Malay majority had grown. The government did not 
redress this matter quickly, and as a result, the 1969 race riot occurred, which 
caused a dramatic change in the political system.  
2. Abdul Razak (1970 - 1976)  
The 1969 racial riot disclosed the strength of the undercurrent of distrust 
among the various ethnic communities. As a result, several actions, including the 
use of coercive measures, were taken by Razak134 to strengthen national unity. 
The first action was to declare the Emergency and to suspend the Parliament for 
two years. The second action was to arrest the opposition parties’ members 
under the ISA. This continued the trend that whenever there was a crisis in 
Malaysia, the opposition parties would be targeted by the government. 
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Because the unity of ethnic communities was the main goal in the post-
1969 riot period, the government's first action was to create the Department of 
National Unity. This department aimed to formulate a national ideology and to 
create new social and economic programs.135 The government used emergency 
legislation such as the ISA and the Sedition Act to ensure racial harmony. In so 
doing, the definition of “sensitive issues” in the Sedition Act was expanded to 
include the special rights of the Malay and the special privileges of Malay rulers.   
From this starting point, the freedom of speech, freedom of press and freedom of 
expression were restricted. The government also took preventive actions against 
individuals who it perceived posed “a challenge to the regime or a serious threat 
to the public order.”136 For instance, the government arrested Lim Kit Siang 
under the ISA for his harsh criticism of the Alliance government during the 1969 
election campaign. 
Second, the government controlled the publication of material that might 
offend other ethnic communities. Publishers were required to obtain licenses 
prior to operations and these licenses could be revoked any time if the publishers 
violated “national sensitivities” or “failed to serve national development goals.”137 
For example, during Operation Lalang, three newspapers (The Star, Watan and 
Sin Chew Jit Poh) were suspended.138 This practice has continued. During the 
political crisis in 1998, the government banned the Malay magazines Detik, al-
Wasilah and Ekslusif because of their “questionable” contents.139 And recently, 
the Sarawak Tribune was suspended immediately due to publishing an article 
entitled, "Cartoon: Not much impact here," which was accompanied by a 
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caricature of the Prophet Muhammad.140  Those two reasons were broad enough 
to cover political offenses. Any speeches or writings that might instigate ethnic 
antagonism were banned.  
Third, Razak broadened the scope of membership in the Alliance party 
and maintained the Alliance party's concept of conciliation. Instead of three major 
parties (UMNO, MCA, MIC), Razak incorporated more parties, including a 
number of opposition parties, into the coalition. He also changed the name of the 
party to “Barisan Nasional” (BN) or National Front. This type of incorporation 
dampened the electoral competition and at the same time enhanced the UMNO’s 
political domination in the coalition.  
Fourth, Razak introduced strict labor legislation to maintain stability and 
manage industry relations peacefully. Several amendments were made to the 
Industrial Relations Act and the Trade Unions Act. The reason behind these 
amendments was to prevent the growth of a strong trade union movement, as 
the government was afraid that the unions might fall under the influence of the 
opposition parties.141 Under these amendments, unions were no longer allowed 
to bargain on issues designated as “managerial prerogatives,” officers or 
employees of political parties were barred from holding any office in the trade 
unions, and the creation of political funds in the trade unions was abolished.142  
Fifth, as university students’ political awareness increased in the 1970s, 
they started to demand greater use of the Malay language in official 
correspondence. They also protested the Thai Prime Minister’s visit to Malaysia 
in 1971, as he was perceived as repressing Muslim Malays in southern 
Thailand.143 However, the major incidents that made government react harshly to 
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143 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, 92. 
students occurred in 1974, when they demonstrated in support of squatters in 
Johor Baru in September, in sympathy with the peasants in Baling in November, 
and held a large demonstration in Kuala Lumpur in December.  As a result, 
thousands of students were arrested under the ISA and the main leaders were 
detained, including Anwar Ibrahim, Ibrahim Ali and Syed Hussin.144 Following 
these demonstrations, the government amended the University and Universities 
Colleges Act (UUCA), prohibiting students and faculty members from getting 
involved in or joining any organizations, political parties or trade unions without 
their universities’ permission. Students also were not allowed to have any 
political affiliations with the political parties and the university faculty was not 
permitted to run for office or participate in campaigns.  
In summary, one could argue that in Malaysia during the Razak period, 
human rights shrank and the situation was tightened. The government 
consolidated its power through legislation and amendments to the Constitution. 
Certain aspects of civil and political rights, such as freedom of speech, freedom 
of assembly, freedom of expression and freedom of association were curtailed. 
Communists were not the only target of the government. Opposition parties, 
university students and faculty and trade union activists were also targeted, and 
the ISA was used as a tool to silence these groups. As Razak put it, 
The object of preventive detention is to safeguard security of the 
country and not punish to persons of crime [sic] . . . The 
government has no desire whatsoever to hinder healthy democratic 
opposition in any way. It is the enemies of democracy who will be 
detained.145    
However, in reality, this was not always the case, as the government 
contradicted these statements by targeting opposition parties.  
3. Hussein Onn (1976 – 1981) 
When Razak died in 1976, Hussein, the deputy prime minister, assumed 
the premiership. During his time, several minor factional crises within UMNO 
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occurred as well as a serious conflict between two components of BN party, 
namely UMNO and PAS. The MCA also faced an internal crisis which had 
negative impacts on the BN and national politics. In order to defuse the situation, 
the government under Hussein arrested two deputy ministers, one MCA official, 
two DAP members of parliament, the chairman of PSRM and two Malay 
journalists under the ISA. They were accused of "direct involvement in activities 
in support of the communist struggle for political power in Malaysia.”146  
The trade unions’ policies were not in accordance with Hussein’s 
government policies. Jomo and Todd, in Trade Unions and the State in 
Peninsular Malaysia, state that “in post-Razak [times] the government tended to 
adopt uncompromising, intolerant and unaccommodating attitudes towards trade 
unions.”147 For instance, the dispute between the Malaysia Airline System (MAS) 
and the Airlines Employees Union (AEU) in 1979 illustrated that the government 
was willing to use any method to end the dispute. The government detained 
some union activists under the ISA and subsequently de-registered the union. 
Hussein had warned the trade unions not to use pressure to support their fight or 
to take any action which might deter investors or threaten the country’s security. 
The warning demonstrated that the government would not hesitate to take action 
against the union.148  
During Hussein’s premiership, the situation regarding civil and political 
liberties remained unchanged. The ISA was still a useful tool and was used by 
Hussein to defuse heated crisis situations. For example, the ISA was used 
against antagonist groups in UMNO and trade union activists.  
Between 1957 and 1981, civil and political rights situation in Malaysia 
could be considered liberal despite the restriction of several rights. In general, the 
rights of Malaysian citizens were stipulated and guaranteed in the federal 
Constitution. However, over time, the Constitution was amended to restrict rights 
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and give more power to the executive. There was no clear polarization of the civil 
and political rights situation in Malaysia during those years, but it is clear that   
civil and political rights shriveled and more restrictions were imposed during 
Razak’s period.     
C. THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION UNDER MAHATHIR (1981 - 2003) 
Mahathir took office on July 16, 1981. At the early stage of his tenure, 
Mahathir was deemed a liberal. He released most of the people detained under 
the ISA and allowed more press freedom. He even lifted the ban on his 
controversial book titled The Malay Dilemma. As a consequence, people felt 
optimistic that a new era of tolerance had begun.149 However, Operation Lalang 
in 1987 was deemed the end of Mahathir’s liberal period. The shift in Mahathir’s 
regime from liberalism to the authoritarian style is discussed at length in the next 
section. This discussion of Mahathir’s regime is divided into two parts covering 
the periods from 1981 to 1990, and from 1990 to 2003.   
1. 1981 - 1990 
At the beginning, Mahathir was very responsive to the public at large when 
it voiced its displeasure with the new amendment to the Societies Act which was 
introduced during Hussien’s period. This new amendment required “politically 
motivated" organizations to register as political societies; the Registrar was given 
broad power to declare any organization as “political.” The aim of this 
amendment was to differentiate social groups which would likely engage in 
political activity from those which were non-political.150  In response to public 
unhappiness, the government amended the Societies Act to undo some of the 
most controversial provisions.151 However, from 1983 onwards, Mahathir’s 
regime showed a definite turn toward authoritarianism and the government 
started to tighten its control over several institutions. This shift was based on 
several factors. The constitutional crisis between UMNO and the royalty, 
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UMNO’s factionalism, an internal crisis in MCA, the Sabah crisis, financial 
scandal and dissatisfaction with Mahathir’s leadership were factors that made 
Mahathir shift dramatically  to authoritarianism (see Table 4). In short, the effects 
of these factors was to “solidify the power of the executive [which] included 
stripping the monarchy of much of its power; cracking down on opposition to the 
government; and severely diminishing the abilities of the judiciary to serve as a 
checks and balance on executive power.”152  
 
Table 4.   Political Events, Principal Outcomes and Significance, 1981 – 1990 
(From: Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir – Malaysian Politics and its 
Discontents (London and New York: Zed Books Ltd, 2003), 6 – 7). 
 
Year(s) Political Event(s) Principal Outcome Major Significance 
1981 Hussien Onn retires Mahathir becomes 
Prime Minister 
Commencement of reformism and 
liberalism 
 Musa-Razaleigh UMNO 
Deputy President contest 
Musa wins and becomes 
Deputy Prime Minister 
(DPM) 
Indications of UMNO’s factionalism 
1982 General Election 1st BN victory led by 
Mahathir 
Mahathir’s new economic policies 
1983-84 Constitutional crisis Stalemate between 
UMNO and royalty 
Centralization of executive power 
1984 2nd Musa-Razaleigh 
contest 
Musa wins, Razaleigh 
loses finance ministry 
Deepening UMNO factionalism 
1984-85 MCA crisis Tan Koon Swan 
becomes MCA president 
Culmination of business and politics in 
MCA 
1986 Sabah crisis Rise of Joseph Pairing 
Kitingan and Parti 
Bersatu Sabah 
Kadazandusun consciousness and 
federal-state strain 
1986 February: Musa resigned 
as DPM 
Ghafar Baba appointed 
DPM 
Dissatisfaction with Mahathir’s 
leadership 
 General election  UMNO’s and DAP’s 
triumphs 
Mahathir remain in power 
1986-87 Musa and Razaleigh form 
Team B 
Team B prepares to 
challenge Team A 
Peak of UMNO’s factionalism 
1987 UMNO election Team A’s narrow victory Purge of Team B and UMNO split 
 Operation Lalang Mass arrests of 
opponents 
End of Mahathir liberalism 
1988 UMNO’s de-registration 
as a party 
Formation of UMNO 
Baru 
Team B dissidents excluded 
 Judicial crisis Impeachment of 
Supreme Court judges 
Mahathirist authoritarianism 
1988-89 Several by-elections: 
mixed victories 
Persistent dissent 
against UMNO Baru 
Inconclusive test of UMNO strength  
1989 Parti Semangat 46 
formed 
Razaleigh leads Team B 
in opposition 
Basis of new coalition in opposition 
1990 General election Barisan Nasional’s 
victory 
Two coalition system; PAS’s return in 
Kelantan 
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At the beginning of 1987, UMNO faced a crisis arising from the contest for 
the presidency. Mahathir’s position as a party leader was challenged and he 
nearly lost despite winning the election with a slim majority of 43 votes. Eleven of 
UMNO’s members were dissatisfied with the election and challenged the validity 
of the result in court. As a result, the High Court ruled that UMNO was an illegal 
party. On appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the decision. This crisis put UMNO 
and Mahathir’s political survival at stake. This crisis also led to the removal of the 
Lord President and two other judges in 1988.  
In October 1987, faced with the possibility of race riots, Mahathir 
abandoned all liberal pretense and launched Operation Lalang. Hundreds of 
people were arrested and the operation closed down three newspaper 
publishers. These people were accused of creating racial tension in the country 
and of manipulating the liberal and tolerant attitude of the government.153 The 
government actions were taken to preserve racial harmony and in the interest of 
internal security. In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, Mahathir 
stated that, "The threat is from the inside . . . So we have to be armed, so to 
speak. Not with guns, but with the necessary laws to make sure the country 
remains stable."154 The aftermath of the operation was that the government had 
a valid justification for restricting fundamental liberties by tightening the grip of 
the executive. 
During his subsequent time in office, Mahathir strengthened and 
enhanced executive power and undermined all the checks and balances of the 
governmental institutions. He amended the Constitution several times so that 
tougher laws were enacted at the expense of individual rights; the opposition in 
Parliament to the dominant UMNO party came to have little importance. In short,   
Mahathir, in unprecedented actions, changed Malaysia's fundamental  
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constitutional system. These changes resulted in criticism by the population who 
were worried because when the executive holds too much power, it is 
dangerous.155  
Mahathir maintains that human rights should be seen in the context of 
different economic and social realities and the distinctive values system of the 
country.156 He further calls for a "rethinking" of human rights. He argues that 
developing countries like Malaysia need to have their own human rights 
standards which fit their level of development as well as their particular cultural 
values.  
2. 1990 – 2003 
Mahathir suppressed human rights, especially civil and political rights, so 
that Malaysia’s human rights practices gradually declined from its independence 
in 1957.157 Several human rights violations occurred under Mahathir’s 
premiership. The Anwar case was the watershed of human rights issues in 
Malaysia. In September 1998, Anwar, Mahathir’s deputy prime minister, was 
arrested and charged with corruption and inappropriate sexual behaviour. 
Descriptions of the case were published locally and internationally. Mahathir 
subsequently used the ISA to arrest and detain sixteen of Anwar’s political 
associates. He also used the law to legitimize his actions against journalists, 
university students, opposition political party leaders, businessmen and others. 
This incident negatively affected public perceptions of human rights and the 
administration of justice in Malaysia.158 Mahathir's treatment of Anwar and the 
way the court conducted the Anwar trial resulted in criticism from the international 
community. Before stepping down as Prime Minister, Mahathir defended his ISA  
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record, saying, “We have to put a stop to menace by all means, even before it 
happens. A law like the ISA, which is not bluntly used, is necessary as a 
preventive measure.”159 
On March 25, 1999, the Malaysian government established a National 
Commission on Human Rights (SUHAKAM)160 under the Human Rights 
Commission of Malaysia Act of 1999. This Act is consistent with the Paris 
Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions. The main objectives of 
the SUHAKAM commission are to promote and protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Malaysia. The SUKAHAM commission is an 
independent body that the people can appeal to with their grievances and 
dissatisfactions regarding human rights abuses. The commission will redress the 
situation where possible. It has been given power by the Parliament to look into 
complaints of human rights infringements; it also advises and assists the 
government in formulating legislation and procedures on human rights. Thirteen 
commissioners were appointed by the King on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister for a two-year tenure period.  As a result, questions have been raised 
about the commission's independence. Furthermore, since its inception, 
SUHAKAM has been accused of being a government tool to silent criticism from 
domestic and international NGOs; it is charged with being aimed at improving the 
government’s image rather than at addressing the root causes of abuse.161 In a 
similar vein, according to Tikamdas, the establishment of SUHAKAM has been 
only cosmetic and intended to disguise the authoritarian regime, cover up public 
officials' scandals and improve the government's image.162   
                                            
159 Mahathir, “Government Never Abused ISA for Power, Personal Gain,” New Strait Times, 
October 31, 2003.  
160 SUHAKAM is the acronym for “Suruhanjaya Hak Asasi Manusia Malaysia” which means 
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161 Geoffrey Robinson, “Human Rights in Southeast Asia: Rhetoric and Reality,” in 
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Wurfel and Bruce Burton, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996) 75.  
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http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2002/4i.html; accessed 26 April 2005.  
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Interestingly, the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States saved 
Mahathir from continued criticism by the international communities. The Global 
War on Terror (GWOT) gave him an excuse to continue using ISA and other 
emergency laws to carry out political repression, mistreatment and torture, all the 
while engaging in more rights abuses.  
In 2002, Mahathir sacked five commissioners of SUHAKAM who were 
deemed to be pro-Western for defending human rights standards. These 
commissioners were vocal in their comments regarding human rights violations 
by the government and specifically by the police. In one of the inquiries into an 
anti-government protest in November 2000, the commissioners found that the 
police had used excessive force against the protestors.163 Further, they 
recommended legal reforms to the government, including the abolition of the 
ISA's provision that political activists could be detained without trial. They stated 
that detention without trial amounted to a human rights violation. They also 
criticized the government for consistently using the ISA “against the political 
dissidents and suspected terrorists alike.”164 These recommendations by the 
commission angered Mahathir, who terminated their tenure as commissioners.  
Although the government proclaimed its absolute right to take whatever 
actions it deemed necessary to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability, 
various parties ranging from local and international NGOs to regional and 
international governments instead condemned the punitive actions of the 
Malaysian government. In fact, the NGOs in the country have commented that 
“the Mahathir-led government, in power from 1981–2003, has inflicted some very 
serious damage to human rights in Malaysia . . . whose effects we have not  
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recovered from.”165 It is quite difficult to get exact numbers of ISA detainees. 
However, NGO statistics indicate that the numbers have increased since 2000 
(Table 6).  
 
Table 5.   Number of Internal Security Act detainees in Kamunting (After:  Figures 
were provided in written answers by Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad 
Badawi, who is also Minister for Internal Security, to questions from 
parliamentary opposition leader Lim Kit Siang, whose statement was 
quoted by AFP in news reports dated 3 February 2005. Cited in 
Aliran’s ISA Watch, Internal Security Act in Malaysia ISA Detention, 
Aliran online. Available at http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2001/3e.htm; 
accessed 14 February 2006.) 
 
Held for alleged 
involvement in:  End-2000 
3 July 
2001 Nov 2001 June 2002 June 2003  Dec 2003 
Human trafficking 
syndicate   21 21 19  - 
Miscellaneous 4 3 3 4 8 2 
Al Ma'unah arms 
heist  29 15 15 15 15 - 
Reformasi 
activities  . 6 5 6 - - 
Free Acheh 
Movement  1 4 3 2  - 
Firearms  3 3 3 - - - 
Currency 
counterfeiting  . 10 8 8  6 
Document 
falsification  . 7 7 7 - - 
Malaysian 
Mujahidin Group  23 - 13 19 18 17
Jemaah Islamiah .  -  -  33  58  66 
Total  60  69 78 113 99  91 
 
In regard to the categories of detainees, there were various target groups 
which differed from time to time depending on the threats. In the 1960s, the ISA 
was used against the communist insurgents, but the trend has changed. The ISA 
                                            
165 NGO, Aliran Monthly, Vol. 25, Issue 8 (2005). Database on-line. Available from 
http://www.aliran/monthly/2005/8c.html; accessed 26 May 2005. 
56 
has been used to arrest “suspect” terrorists, “Reformasi” activists, university 
students, bloggers, passport forgers and those suspected of involvement in other 
offenses that might be prejudicial to national security (Table 7).   
 
Table 6.   Waves of ISA arrests in Malaysia since April 2001 (From: Aliran’s ISA 
Watch, Internal Security Act in Malaysia ISA Detentions, Aliran Online, 
Database on-line. Available at 
http://www.aliran.com/monthly/2001/3e.htm (ed. 14 February 2006)). 
 
Targeted group  Period  No. held  
Reformasi Activists  Apr 2001  10  
University Students  July 2001  2  
Militants/terrorists May - July 2001  6  
KMM members  Aug 2001  10  
   
KMM members  Sept - Oct 2001  8  
KMM members  Dec 2001 - Jan 2002 13  
KMM members Jan 2002  10  
KMM members  Apr 2002  14  
KMM member  Sept 2002  1  
KMM members  Oct 2002  5  
KMM members  Nov 2002  3*  
Terror rumors via e-mail  Dec 2002  10*  
JI members  Dec 2002  2*  
JI members  Jan 2003  4*  
JI members Feb 2003  3*  
JI member  Mar 2003  1  
JI member  June 2003  1  
JI member Aug 2003  1  
   
Suspected involvement in JI 
activities  Nov 2003  13  
Alleged JI involvement Jan 2004  2 (1*)  
Indonesian members of the 
group behind the Bali 
bombings  
Jan/Feb 2004  6*  
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Targeted group  Period  No. held  
Alleged forgery of 
passports/travel documents April 2004  1  
Alleged involvement in 
nuclear parts network  May 2004  1  
Immigration dept officials 
allegedly supplying 
Malaysian passports to a 
syndicate  
2004  2  
Alleged Thai separatist  Jan 2005  1  
Allegedly issuing forged 
documents to human 
trafficking syndicates  
Sept 2004 - Jan 2005 9  
* Authorities have not revealed their identities.   
 
The government claims that restrictions on civil and political rights are 
necessary, first, to preserve racial stability in a plural society.166 It is important for 
the government to ensure ethnic communities live in peace and harmony. The 
government does not want a repeat of the 1969 race riots.  
Second, the restrictions on civil and political rights also cover up 
government officials’ wrongdoing. For example, Irene Fernandez was convicted 
of disclosing the maltreatment and abuses in the illegal immigrants’ detention 
camp. Similarly, Ezam Mohd Noor was sentenced to imprisonment for revealing 
the investigation by the Anti Corruption Agency (ACA) of corrupt practices by a 
government minister and chief minister.  
Third, restrictions imposed on civil and political rights helped to protect 
Mahathir’s position. In his view, if the population was given too much freedom, it 
might escalate tension in the Barisan Nasional, which would endanger his 
position as prime minister. He blamed the press for exploiting racial issues. This 
exploitation had forced Mahathir to use coercive measures to weaken the 
opposition and frustrate his enemies within UMNO.167   
                                            
166 Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia, 95 and Khoo, 285. 
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Asia: The Wind of Change (Colorado: Westview Press Inc., 1995), 107. 
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Fourth, by restricting civil and political rights, Mahathir protected his 
UMNO party from court decisions that might have limited his power. As noted 
above, in 1988 UMNO was declared an illegal party by the Supreme Court. As a 
result, Mahathir lost his position as prime minister. In response, he established 
UMNO Baru; within one day, his application was approved by the Registrar of 
Societies. During that short period, Ling Leong Sik held the appointment of prime 
minister. This incident really jeopardized UMNO and Mahathir’s political survival.   
One could say that the reasons Mahathir continued to impose restrictions 
on civil and political liberties was, first, he always believed that he was 
completely right. He has a high level of self-confidence. He believes that plans 
must be fulfilled without any barriers. Thus, he felt justified doing whatever 
seemed necessary to stay in power, including violating human rights.168 
Second, Mahathir does not believe in democracy. He has said this on 
many occasions. To him, to have a democracy it is sufficient to have periodic 
elections and government was elected by the people. He rejected the western 
definition of democracy and held the view that Malaysia's democracy is different 
than other countries'. He held that Malaysia is a democratic country based on the 
following criteria: direct representation of the public, majority rule through a 
government of elected representatives, periodic elections allowing for possible 
replacement or change in government, separation of power between executive, 
judicial and legislative branches, and responsiveness of elected representatives 
and the government to public opinion.169 He even urged the population to shun 
democracy because democracy will cause chaos and trouble. Muzaffar Tate 
portrayed Mahathir as a “benevolent despot – like the 18th century autocratic 
monarchs of Russia, Prussia and Austria who were so styled – full of good 
intentions but with bad ways of carrying them out. “170  
                                            
168 Nick Papadopaulas, “Malaysia under Mahathir,” Time Asia (18 July 2001) Database on-
line. Available at http://www.time.com/time/asia/news/printout/0,9788,168000,00.htm; accessed 
25 May 2005.  
169 Ibid. 
170 Muzaffar Tate, “The Mahathir Legacy: The Bottom Line Is that Mahathir Does Not Believe 
in Democracy,” Aliran Monthly, Database on-line. Available at 
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Third, continual imposition of human rights restrictions strengthened 
Mahathir’s position in power. Mahathir did not hesitate to take action against 
those who might threaten his position. For example, Anwar was sacked from the 
Deputy Prime Minister Office.   
Fourth, Mahathir relied on the repressive laws against his enemies. He 
used the ISA, the OSA, the Sedition Act and PPPA to silent his dissidents. Lim 
Kit Siang, Karpal Singh, Anwar Ibrahim and Dr. Syed Hussin were among the 
people detained under the ISA.  
Mahathir took the initiative to consolidate executive control and eliminate 
autonomous nodes of power. Even though repressive legislation was already 
enacted in the 1950s and 1960s, these laws were further amended by Mahathir 
to close the loopholes whenever the government lost a case or the court 
decisions were not in his favor. Each fundamental liberty enshrined in 
Constitution had its own legislative restriction. As described in Table 8, these 
restrictions are mostly by legislative action and do not give detainees room for 
judicial review.  
 
Table 7.   Civil and Political Rights and Their Restrictions (From: Johan 
Saravanamuthu, Human rights in Malaysia – Regression or 
progression, Aliran Monthly, Database on-line. Available at 




Right of Freedom Legislative Restriction 
Article 5 Liberty of the person Internal Security Act, 1960: Restricted 
Residence Enactment (CAP. 39); Sec. 
117, Criminal Procedure Code (CAP. 6) 
Article 6 Protection against slavery 
and forced labor 
Essential (Self-Reliance) Regulations, 
1975; National Service Ordinance 
Article 9 Protection against 
banishment; freedom of 
movement 
ISA 1960; Banishment Act, 1948; 
Immigration acts, 1959 and 1963 
Article 10(1)(a) Freedom of speech and 
expression 
Sedition Act, 1948 (and Amendments, 
1971); Official Secrets Act, 1972 (and 




Right of Freedom Legislative Restriction 
Publishing Act, 1948 (Amendment 1988); 
Control of Imported Publications Act, 1959 
Article 10(1)(b) Freedom of peaceful 
assembly 
Public Order (Preservation) Ordinance, 
1958; Police Act, 1967 (and Amendments, 
1988) 
Article 10(1)(c) Freedom of association Trade Unions Act, 1959 (and 1980 and 
1989 Amendments); Societies Act, 1966 
(and 1981 Amendments); University and 
University Colleges Act, 1971 (and 1975 
Amendments) - discipline of Student Rules 
and Discipline of Staff Rules 
Article 10(1)(c) Freedom of association 
and right to industrial 
action, including strike 
Essential (Prohibition of Strikes and 
Prescribed Industrial Actions) Regulations, 
1965; Industrial Relations Act, 1967, 
Amendment, 1971 and 1975 
Article 121 Principle of judicial review Amendments to Article 121, 1988; 
Amendments to ISA, 1988; Amendments 
to ISA, 1989 
 
D. HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION AFTER MAHATHIR (2003 – 2005) 
After Mahathir's retirement in 2003, his deputy Abdullah Ahmad Badawi 
took the premiership. He was the fourth of Mahathir’s deputies. Abdullah started 
his premiership with promises of change—to combat corruption, to improve 
human rights and to improve the image of the police. On March 2004, the 
nation's eleventh general elections were held after an eight-day campaign. 
Abdullah won a decisive mandate due to his personal appearance, religion and, 
most importantly, his mandate against corruption. Brad Adam, Executive Director 
of Asia Division of Human Rights Watch, urged Abdullah to end Mahathir’s 
human rights abuses. He said,  
Mahathir’s human rights legacy is not one to be proud of. Badawi 
needs to do things differently on human rights. Badawi has the 
opportunity to make Malaysia a leader in the region by promoting 
political and cultural pluralism.171 
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After three years in office, “Abdullah’s promises of democracy reform have 
not been translated into real substantive change.”172 However, he seems to have 
relaxed control over the judiciary. In this respect, the courts have been able to 
reclaim some independence as stipulated in the federal Constitution. In several 
instances, the courts’ decisions were free from executive intervention. In one 
case, the Shah Alam High Court overturned the conviction and sentence of Ezam 
Mohd Nor, the Keadilan Youth wing.173 A second instance occurred in August 
2004, when the Federal Court overturned Anwar’s conviction for sexual 
misconduct; he was immediately freed from prison. Though exonerated of the 
sexual misconduct allegation, he cannot be active in politics for five years, since 
his six year conviction for corruption still stands. And, in a third instance, in 
October 2004 the Penang High Court issued a ruling favorable to the Keadilan 
candidate Datin Seri Wan Azizah in the general election petition contention.    
Despite returning some independence to the judiciary, judicial 
independence is not fully restored. Abdullah has shown no sign of changing the 
government’s arbitrary and oppressive use of the ISA. The government under 
Abdullah has maintained Mahathir's legacy of an authoritarian style of 
governance. In other words, repressive laws are still enforced. The civil and 
political rights that were restricted under Mahathir are still curtailed. Freedom of 
speech and expression are no better. The abolishment of the ISA seems only a 
dream. Defending the ISA, Abdullah has said that “we have in place tough laws 
and some of them are preventive in nature . . . We do not apologize for them.”174 
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Echoing his boss's statement, Nazri Aziz, Minister in the Prime Minister's Office, 
strongly believes that the government should have strong control over the 
population. He says that “the concept of separation of power between the 
legislative, judiciary and executive is 'too idealistic' to be implemented in the 
country.”175   
SUHAKAM's performance has been very frustrating. SUHAKAM has failed 
to demonstrate the courage to uphold its purpose. This commission was deemed 
a tool of the government tool since the appointment of a new chairman and five 
other commissioners who have not stood up for civil and political rights in 
Malaysia. These appointees were senior civil servants who all along had worked 
for the government of Mahathir.   
In general, the human rights situation in the post Mahathir period has not 
gotten better. The promises made by Abdullah to make “changes” have not been 
kept. As Abdullah acknowledges the need for authoritarian control, it is doubtful 
that there will be any improvement in the future. In his maiden speech in 
Parliament as prime minister, he highlighted his regime’s democratic procedures. 
Democracy is the best system of governance. . . . We must be 
open and ready to accept criticism and contrary views to ensure 
that a culture of democracy thrives. . . . However, democracy does 
not mean absolute freedom . . . We cannot compromise when 
dealing with threats posed by extremism, terrorism, and 
militancy.176 
Some argue that under Abdullah, controls on institutions other than the 
judiciary will remain unchanged; in fact, controls may be tightened or even worse 
than under Mahathir. As of now, it is difficult to see that Abdullah will make 
changes on human rights.  
E. CONCLUSION 
For the past 48 years, since its independence, Malaysia has faced 
external and internal threats. The government succeeded in dealing with these 
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threats. But the most serious government concern right now is the internal threat. 
In terms of human rights, between 1957 and 1981, the standard was considered 
liberal although some restrictions were imposed. Over time, the federal 
Constitution was amended to restrict rights and give more power to the 
executive. Even though there was no clear polarization of civil and political rights 
in Malaysia during that period, it is clear that under Razak, human rights 
shriveled.  
During the Mahathir period, human rights standards in Malaysia declined. 
For 22 years as prime minister, Mahathir brought the judiciary under executive 
control, centered more power in the government, lessened the power of the King, 
used the ISA arbitrarily, and used the government mechanisms for his own gain. 
Mahathir lowered the human rights standards of Malaysia to the point where it 
became a “pariah” state. He inflicted serious damage to human rights in 
Malaysia. Though he received criticism from the international community 
regarding his government's human rights practice, he did not care, nor did he 
respond to those criticisms. He believed that no country could claim exclusive 
rights on human rights. He believed that restrictions on human rights were 
necessary to preserve racial stability in a plural society, to cover up the 
government officials’ wrongdoing, to defend his position, and to protect UMNO 
from court decisions that might have limited his power.  Thus, he urged that 
Malaysia should have its own human rights standard according its own mold. 
Mahathir even sacked human rights commissioners who criticized the routine use 
of the ISA against political dissidents by the government. Statistics on ISA 
detainees demonstrate that the categories of detainees varies over time. In short, 
Mahathir attacked or retaliated against any critics or anyone he saw as 
prejudicial to national security. The bottom line of is that Mahathir’s continued to 
restrict civil and political rights, even though it worsened internal security, 
because of power and to remain in his position.  One could safely say that power 
means everything to him. As long as he remained in power, he could do anything 
which he found justified. He used all the mechanisms of government to ensure 
that his position was not being threatened. Under his rule, many human rights 
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violations were documented involving the freedom of assembly, expression, 
association and movement. Croissant argues that the longer a leader stays in the 
office the more he will lose touch with reality.177 That what happened to Mahathir. 
He was not sensitive to the demands from the people and the NGOs to improve 
human rights standards. He felt he was always right. As Tate writes,   
Mahathir is by no means an Idi Amin, Marcos or Mugabe. He has 
been inspired by great visions and great dreams of a mighty 
Malaysia. But for anyone of a liberal, democratic persuasion, the 
price is intolerably high. Nor is there any guarantee that once the 
hand of the master puppeteer has been removed unity and stability 
will survive.178 
With all the coercive apparatus that he had available, he could silence all 
internal dissidents. Surprisingly, the public at large supported him. The 
justifications that he presented for his actions were accepted by the population. 
These justifications will be explained in detail in Chapter IV. 
In the post Mahathir period, the standard of human rights in Malaysia has 
remained the same. Although there were promises to improve the human rights 
standard, these have so far been merely empty promises. Except for the release 
of Anwar Ibrahim by the Federal Court, the situation has remained stagnant. In 
the beginning, Abdullah seemed a promising candidate to improve the standard 
of human rights by combating corruption among UMNO members, civil servants 
and the police. But as of this time, people are still awaiting dramatic 
improvements. Thus one might correctly say that human rights in Malaysia are 
more rhetoric than reality.     
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IV.  LEGITIMIZING HUMAN RIGHTS RESTRICTIONS: THE 
RHETORIC AND THE REALITY   
The erosion of fundamental rights and liberties, the manipulation of 
the media and the blatant undermining of the institutions of state 
entrusted with the task of upholding the rule of law and ensuring 
justice and fair play should not go unchallenged! We must refuse to 
be intimidated. In times like this Malaysians should stand up and be 
counted.179 
Society for Christian Reflection 
This chapter examines the rhetoric and reality of legitimizing human rights 
restrictions in Malaysia between 1957 and 2005. The main purpose is to analyze 
the reasons for the change in rationalizations and how these rationalizations 
affected internal stability. Although the rationales given for restricting rights 
overlapped over time, they can be distinguished from one another for analytical 
purposes. The analysis in this chapter will demonstrate that   four rationales can 
be considered the foundation of shrinking human rights in Malaysia: anti-
communism, racial harmony, “Asian values” and developmentalism, and 
terrorism.  
A. THE ANTI-COMMUNIST RATIONALE 
As discussed in Chapter II, the First Emergency was declared in 1948 by 
the British in response to the armed struggle of the Communist Party of Malaya 
(CPM). The British later adopted a wide range of actions, including the Briggs 
Plan, which “involved a massive resettlement of thousands of people from 
remote areas to the relative security of new villages.”180 Throughout the First 
Emergency, which the government declared ended in 1960, thousands of people 
(civilians, security forces, and communist terrorists) were killed and wounded.  
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Table 8.   Numbers of people killed, wounded, missing, captured and 
surrendered during the First Emergency (1948 – 1960) (From: 
Compiled by the author based on information in Challis (1987). 
 
 Killed Wounded Missing Captured Surrendered 
Security Forces 1,856 2,560 - - - 
Civilians 2,473 1,385 810 - - 
Communist 
Terrorists 
6,698 2,819 - 1,286 2,696 
  
1. Rhetoric 
The First Emergency saw the birth of the Printing Presses Ordinance 
(1948) which aimed “to exercise control over the ownership of printing and 
publication in the face of the increasing threats from the communists in 
Malaysia.”181  Several subsequent laws were promulgated to control the 
communist threats using the media, including the ISA in 1960, which empowered 
the Home Minister “to impose preventive detention without trial on any person 
acting in the manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia.”182 The ISA also gave 
the police wide power to arrest without warrant and to detain any person for a 
maximum of 60 days.  
As discussed in Chapter III, the enactment of the ISA caused suspicions 
among the Malaysian public since the Malaysian government during that time 
had already succeeded in its fight against the CPM. The opposition criticized the 
government’s action because they believed that Article 150 of the federal 
Constitution183 was sufficient to protect the country from communist threats. 
Tunku, the first prime minister, justified the ISA before the Parliament, stating, 
 
                                            
181 Zaharom Naim, “The Structure of the Media Industry: Implications for Democracy,” in 
Democracy in Malaysia: Discourses and Practices, eds. Francis Loh Kok Wah and Khoo Boo 
Teik, 111–139 (Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995), 123. 
182 Gordon Means, Malaysian Politics: The Second Generation (Oxford: Oxford University 
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183 Article 150 of the Federal Constitution empowers Yang DiPertuan Agong (the King), on 
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emergency exists whereby the security, economic life or public order of Malaysia is threatened.   
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The ISA introduced in 1960 was designed and meant to be used 
solely against the communists . . . My Cabinet colleagues and I 
gave a solemn promise to Parliament and the nation that the 
immense powers given to the government under the ISA would 
never be used to stifle legitimate opposition and silence lawful 
dissent.184  
Echoing Tunku’s justification, Hussien Onn, the third prime minister, said, 
The ISA is a measure aimed at preventing the resurgence of the earlier 
communist threat to the nation. . . . During my term of office as Prime Minister; I 
made every effort to ensure that the pledges of my predecessors, that power 
under the ISA would not be misused to curb lawful political opposition and [that 
lawful political opposition and] democratic citizen activity were respected.185   
In spite of these justifications, the government did use the ISA for 
purposes other than combating communism. The ISA was used against 
opposition party leaders who opposed the formation of Malaysia in 1963. It was 
used to arrest Indonesian supporters and sympathizers during the Confrontation 
of 1963 – 1966. In addition, according to Munro-Kua, prior to the 1964 national 
election, the ISA was used “to minimize the opposition electoral challenge.”186 
These incidents demonstrated that the government had breached its own 
pledges.   
In 1968, the CPM launched its second armed struggle against the 
government. That armed struggle was motivated by the North Vietnamese 
success in their armed struggle over South Vietnam. The CPM also had moral 
support from the People's Republic of China and Thailand. Domestic instabilities, 
including racial distrust between the Malay and the Chinese, the transition from 
the British to the newly-formed Malaysian Armed Forces in early 1960, and the  
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lack of monitoring on Malaysia's northern border also motivated the CPM to 
launch its second armed struggle. The government officially declared the Second 
Emergency on June 17, 1968; it has never been lifted. 
In response to the Second Emergency, the government enhanced the 
measures that were taken during the First Emergency. In addition, Prime Minister 
Tun Abdul Razak visited China in 1974 to strengthen diplomatic relations.   
Malaysian security forces had joint border patrols and joint operations with Thai 
and Indonesian security forces. The government also introduced the Security and 
Development Concept (KESBAN), particularly for the rural areas, which involved 
the military with other government agencies. On December 2, 1989, an 
agreement ending the CPM struggle was signed between the CPM and the 
governments of Malaysia and Thailand.187 
2. Reality 
The restrictions on fundamental rights have been justified by the perceived 
threat of the CPM. The 1948 Emergency Ordinance gave the authorities power to 
enact legislation that superseded existing laws and suspended existing civil and 
political liberties. Throughout the Second Emergency (1968–1989), repressive 
legislation was used to prevent subversion other than communism. Most of the 
legislation, and particularly the ISA, was used to suppress opposition party 
leaders, who were arrested and later accused of being communist sympathizers 
or of indirect involvement in communist activities.  For example, in 1976, during 
factional tensions within the UMNO, six politicians were arrested.188 The 
government said they were arrested   
. . . because of their involvement in the activities of the Communist 
United Front or in activities which could be regarded as assisting 
the advancement of the Communist United Front, whether directly 
or indirectly, deliberately or unknowingly.189 
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Similarly, in 1979, 22 members of the Airline Employees Union were 
detained under the ISA after “a pay raise dispute” at the government-run 
Malaysia Airline System (MAS). They were detained to prevent them from 
continuing acts deemed “prejudicial to the maintenance of an essential 
service.”190  
Freedom of speech and expression were also curbed. For instance, in 
1976, the managing editor of the New Straits Times Press (NSTP) and the news 
editor of Berita Harian were arrested under the ISA, accused “involvement in a 
communist subversion plot to weaken the belief in religion among Malays and 
convert them to communism.”191 However, as discussed in Chapter III, many 
people over the years who were not involved in communist and subversive 
activities were detained. Interestingly, people involved in legitimate and 
democratic activities that threatened the government or individuals in power were 
also liable to be sanctioned under the ISA. Given these circumstances, Bridget 
Welsh rightly comments that “with the strong anti-communist orientation gained 
from its independence, the Malaysian government has consistently used the 
State to squash the political left.”192 Thus, one might conclude that since its 
promulgation, the ISA has been abused by the government for its own political 
interests.  
It is worth noting that anti-communist rhetoric has affected Malaysia's 
internal stability. The government succeeded in its crackdown on the communist 
movement in Malaysia and eliminated the communist threat. The CPM 
organization disintegrated, its morale crushed, but because the ISA was used to 
silence political dissidents, it created fear among the population.193  
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B. THE RACIAL HARMONY RATIONALE 
Preserving racial harmony has been another rationale used to legitimize 
Malaysia’s human rights restrictions. Since independence, the nation's ruling 
elites perceived that interethnic cooperation and mutual understanding among 
people was the main characteristic of the Malaysian political system.194 This 
cooperation and mutual understanding worked well until 1969. 
1. Rhetoric 
The 1969 race riot had a deep impact on the Malaysian political 
landscape. The underlying cause of this riot was the dissatisfaction between the 
races and unequal treatment of the Chinese and Indian minorities. From that 
point on, racial harmony was discussed and emphasized by the government.   
In the aftermath of the riots, the ruling elites believed that interethnic 
cooperation in a multiethnic political coalition was a viable vehicle to racial 
harmony. The multiethnic coalition was deemed to provide protection for the 
rights of the three different communities. To make this perception real, after 
succeeding Tunku as Prime Minister, Razak changed the Alliance Party to a 
new, larger BN coalition. Instead of three major parties in the Alliance Party, the 
new National Front incorporated 14, including former opposition parties.195 The 
aim of the coalition was to pursue national harmony and socio-economic 
development. It also tried to entrench racial cooperation under one party while at 
the same removing “the main element of ‘Bargain 1957’ from the arena of 
political debate.”196 In 1971, NEP was introduced to redress the underlying cause 
of the 1969 riot.197 The main importance of NEP was to promote national unity by 
eradicating poverty, by raising income levels and employment opportunities for 
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all races, and by restructuring Malay society and correcting its economic 
imbalances. In addition, new rules and regulations to prevent future violence 
were introduced. The federal Constitution and the Sedition Act were amended. 
The meaning of “sensitive issues” was expanded to include the position of the 
Malay rulers, the use of Malay as the national language, the "special position" of 
the Malays, the rights of non-Malay citizens to their citizenship and the status of 
Islam as the official religion.198 Another outcome of the 1969 riot was the 
introduction of the Official Secrets Act (OSA), introduced to prohibit any person 
from getting information designated an “official secret” that might be used by the 
nation's enemies. 
In October 1987, the Chinese expressed their dissatisfaction on various 
issues, especially Chinese education, Chinese language, the promotion of non- 
Mandarin-speaking ethnic Chinese teachers in Chinese schools and the NEP.  
The Malay retaliated and planned the biggest Malay rally in Kuala Lumpur to 
coincide with UMNO’s 41st anniversary. During this political crisis, the 
government used the “ethnic unrest” rationalization and launched Operasi Lalang 
which arrested hundreds of people, most of them related to the opposition 
party.199 They were detained under the ISA, which allowed a two-year detention 
without trial; it was alleged that they promoted ethnic tensions. In reference to 
this "weeding operation," Mahathir remarked, “We used the ISA to isolate those 
who had created racial tension. When they had realized what they had done, we 
released all of them.”200  
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2. Reality 
The rhetoric of racial harmony was used by the government as a part of 
Malaysia’s internal security agenda. The government believed that the national 
economy would grow stronger if all races worked together and lived in harmony, 
and put its efforts into promoting and preserving ethnic integration throughout the 
country. Any attempts to change the status quo were perceived by the 
government as undermining racial harmony; such challenges were not tolerated. 
These challenges, including criticism of the government, were often defined as   
threats to ethnic harmony. In order to rebuild confidence and encourage racial 
harmony, in 1971 the government amended the Sedition Ordinance of 1948. The 
amendment curbed freedom of speech and of the press by prohibiting public 
discussion of “sensitive issues.” Any act, speech or publication that might hurt the 
feelings of other ethnic groups was prohibited under this amendment.201 In other 
words, this amendment was simply intended to remove ethnic issues from 
political debate.202 In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review, 
Mahathir stated that if the multicultural, multi-religious, multiracial, and 
multilingual differences were discussed openly, it might be dangerous to internal 
security.203  
The government used its legal apparatus to maintain racial harmony. 
Operasi Lalang illustrates the government’s willingness to use repressive laws 
against the opposition. Because the 1969 race riots left bitter memories, any 
ethnic contention remains tied up with this incident.  
Despite government emphasis on racial harmony, ethnic violence 
occurred several times after 1969. First, an ethnic clash occurred on March 28, 
1998 in Georgetown, Penang. This time, the clash was between minority Indian 
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and majority Malay, because the former had built their temple illegally close to a 
mosque. In this incident, 185 people were detained and four injured. The incident 
spread statewide within a few days. 
Similarly, on March 4, 2001, other clashes, again between Indians and 
Malay, occurred in Kampung Medan, a squatter district in Kuala Lumpur. The 
clashes began over a disagreement between two households regarding a funeral 
procession and a wedding party.204 The Indians were preparing a funeral 
procession while the Malay celebrated a wedding. Suddenly, an Indian “drunken 
motorcyclist” kicked some chairs in a temporary shed on the road outside the 
wedding house, sparking the clash. Rumors of Malay-Indian clashes spread 
around the district and escalated to the point where armed gangs were roaming 
neighborhoods and slashing people. In these incidents, five of the dead were 
Indians, and one was an Indonesian construction worker mistaken for Malay.205   
Ethnic tensions always existed in this plural society. No matter what the 
measures, and how they were implemented by the government, sometimes the 
conflict is inevitable. However, in an interview with Perspective, Hishamudin, the 
BN Youth Chief, denied that these clashes resulted from racial disharmony. He 
said, 
There are housing problems, water problems, and amenities that 
are lacking that builds up causes of stress. These are things that 
build up to tension in that area. And sometimes as a result of that, 
you find that birds of a feather flock together when there is a 
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racial disharmony, but more to do with social issues and 
infrastructural inadequacies, sharing of resources and so on that 
causes stress because of inadequate resources.206  
In contrast, Earl Conteh-Morgan argues that there will always be tensions 
between minorities and the majority whenever inequalities and social problems 
exist, such as ethnic discrimination, inflation that aggravates racial tension, the 
lack of  government response to  demands for socio-economic reforms, and 
cleavages between the classes, religions or races.207  
Ironically, the aftermath of the funeral-wedding conflict revealed the 
government's failure to redress social problems, inadequate infrastructure and 
resources, and poverty in that particular area. Ethnic tension did not develop 
overnight. It had existed for years. One should not look this incident in isolation, 
but rather through the lens of racial harmony. The racial issue in this incident 
should not be swept under the carpet. In short, the BN Youth Chief's denial, his 
claim that the incident was caused by social problems and infrastructural 
inadequacies, is implausible; it seems to fit into the general argument by Earl 
Conteh-Morgan.    
Furthermore, racial harmony was used to promote Malay hegemony. As 
the major component in the BN coalition government, UMNO was projected as 
the guardian of Malay and bumiputera interests. This projection was important to 
UMNO for its legitimacy. The NEP gave the Malay supreme political power and 
economic privileges and these were incorporated into the state’s policies. Even 
though the NEP was meant for all races in Malaysia, its main objective was to 
protect Malay hegemony. It had as its platform the pursuit of a political agenda 
rather than an economic agenda. In supporting this argument, Milne correctly 
comments that: 
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The NEP was political in its origin; its launching was prompted by 
desire to avoid a repetition of the political events of May 1969 . . .  
The implementation of the NEP, as determined by the government, 
is heavy with political implications. The unintended consequences 
of its implementation are less easy to discern, but are equally 
certain to affect the future shape of politics in Malaysia.208  
While supporting Milne’s comment, Welsh states that “ethnic harmony is 
based on the favored status of the Malay community.”209 Nevertheless, during 
the budget speech on Oct 1998, Mahathir denied the ethnic clash in March of 
that year, stating that “the success and impact in the distribution of wealth 
through the NEP is evident from the fact that racial riots have not occurred during 
the economic crisis. Malaysian of all races live peacefully and clearly have a 
sense of patriotism.”210  
The promotion of racial harmony has limited civil liberties. Freedom of 
speech and expression and freedom of assembly have been curtailed and these 
have led to the use of repressive legislation like the ISA to imprison political 
dissidents. While the Sedition Act is intended to proscribe “seditious” groups, the 
Printing Presses Publication Act (PPPA) is used to control the media. PPPA was 
introduced in 1984. It allows the Home Minister to grant or withdraw a printing 
license or publishing permit to any local and foreign press. If foreign journalists or 
publishers did not appear before the court to face charges of publishing material 
“prejudicial to the national security,” their large deposit is forfeited. The Home 
Minister has the power to censor, to ban the offending publication, to reject the 
application or to revoke the permit for publishing, and his decision is final—no 
appeal is permitted. In other words, PPPA disallowed judicial review. For this 
reason, the Act has given too much discretionary power to the Home Minister, 
which has enhanced the power of the government to control the press.  
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As mentioned above, the OSA, introduced in 1972, prohibits publication or 
public dissemination of government information that might be critical to national 
security. It has been used to restrict journalists' reports; it imposes legal controls 
over investigative journalism and freedom of the press.211 As a result, according 
to Zaharom, the OSA has “discouraged concerned and conscientious citizens 
from demanding their rights to information and subsequently cast doubts about 
the transparency of the government.”212 Such doubts were raised in 2002 when 
the youth leader of Keadilan party, Ezam Mohd Noor, was charged and found 
guilty under the OSA of revealing the corrupt practices of two government 
ministers.213 
There is no doubt that the government has used repressive laws to 
hamper opposition political participation. Free and open political debates have 
been impeded by the PPPA, the Sedition Act and the OSA. If political opinions 
are regarded as a threat to social peace and national security, speakers are 
punishable under the ISA, Sedition Act or OSA.  Instead of preserving racial 
harmony and attaining political stability, the government used its legislation to 
strengthen its position and enhance the power of the executive.214 As perceived 
by Mahathir, “only the government was able to determine, from information it 
received, what action was necessary to preserve the country’s stability and 
security.”215       
C. THE “ASIAN VALUES” AND DEVELOPMENTALIST RATIONALE 
In 1993, all countries (including Malaysia) that attended the Vienna 
Human Rights Conference agreed to adopt the principle of universality and 
indivisibility:   
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All human rights are universal, indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated . . . While the significance of national and regional 
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of the states, 
regardless of their political, economic and cultural system, to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedom.216 
Nevertheless, some of the Asian countries have put limitations to their 
acceptance of the principle of universality, claiming that the development of the 
country should be given priority over the rights of individuals. The Asian 
countries, led by Singapore and Malaysia, challenged the Western claims of 
human rights abuses and thereby distanced Asian culture and political system 
from the West.217 
1. Rhetoric  
At the core of the “Asian values” argument lies the assumption that Asian 
cultures have certain similarities, despite Asia’s many languages, religions, 
histories, political systems, prejudices and hatreds. “Asian values” emphasize the 
respect for hierarchy and authority, centrality and cohesion of the family, and 
social consensus, including avoidance of overt conflict in social relations. In 
addition, “Asian values” focus on “education and self discipline, acceptance of 
diversity of spiritual and philosophical authority in theory, but at the same time, 
enforced social consensus among such diversity in practice.”218 To the “Asian 
values” advocates, the community should be given priority over individuals. The 
government should focus on developing the country and ensuring that the 
economy grows so that the population can receive the benefits of development.  
On the other hand, “Western standards” focus on universality and 
individualism. To the Westerners, everyone has the same rights and all are equal 
in the light of international human rights. People have been provided room to 
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express themselves and their grievances, freedom of association, protection from 
arbitrary political imprisonment, and freedom from restrictions on democratic 
processes.219 Advocates for this view argue that human rights should protect the 
population from the state’s tyranny. To them, the “Asian values” rationale is used 
to legitimize authoritarian regimes. Syed Hamid, Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, 
says, “The western theory of human rights is deeply influenced by market 
capitalism, political liberalism and individualism.”220 It gives top priority to civil 
and political rights, but there is insufficient recognition of the need for 
socioeconomic entitlements.       
The “Asian values” and the “Western standards” debate is perhaps best 
summarized by Tang’s article A Clash of Values? Human Rights in the Post- 
Cold War World 221 Tang asserts that the debate on human rights between the 
West and the East is between two approaches:  the post colonial approach, and 
the neo colonial approach.222 He explains that the former developed from the 
liberal tradition, which emphasizes the interdependence of states and the triumph 
of the liberal democracies over authoritarianism. He writes,  
The western approach to human rights, which places more 
importance on civil and political rights and the universality of human 
rights on the basis of the liberal tradition, is usually associated with 
the post colonial approach.223  
Meanwhile, the neo-colonial approach “sees a continuation from the 
colonial era to the present,” with the West exploiting the developing countries and 
creating a new world order.224 In sum, the post colonial approach was associated 
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with the “Western standard” of human rights with its emphasis on individualism, 
while the neo-colonial approach was identified with “Asian values” which stress 
the importance of economic and social rights (including cultural differences).  
The Asian countries argue that “universal conceptions of human rights are 
incompatible with the ‘Asian values.’”225 Their presumption is that the UDHR and 
related covenants on civil political rights (ICCPR) and economic, social and 
culture rights (ICESCR) are of Western origin and thus emphasize individuality. 
To them, those human rights revolutions resulted from the Western enthusiasm 
for liberal philosophy but at the same time reveal Western international 
hegemony.226 As Donnelly puts it, internationally recognized human rights “set 
out as a hegemonic political model something much like the liberal democratic 
welfare of Western Europe.”227 These “Western standards” were also deemed a 
sort of capitalist imperialism. In fact, the West tries to impose its human rights 
values on the developing countries. The Western countries examine the human 
rights standards of specific countries prior to giving aid or doing business. For 
example, the U.S State Department will brief the Congress about the human 
rights standards of countries around the world.228 The pressure that the Western 
countries put on Asian countries over human rights has been also construed as 
“an attempt to undermine their political position and thus, a threat to regime 
survival.”229 By imposing the “West’s standards” on developing countries, they 
were deemed intrusions on national sovereignty. Mahathir has this to say about 
the West's accusations of improper human rights practice in Malaysia:  
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[I]t is with regard to freedom from oppression and brutality that 
Western hypocrisy is at its worst. Western governments, their 
media and their NGOs, are tireless in their condemnation of non-
Western countries for their human rights records. They threaten 
sanctions, withdrawal of aid, stoppage of loans, economic and 
trade union boycotts and actual military strikes against those they 
accused of violating human rights. They even kidnap people in 
other countries in order to try them in their courts under their laws if 
they see fit to do so. They have no respect for independence or 
territorial integrity in their zeal to uphold their human rights 
principle.230 
Mahathir also argued that the ISA was necessary to keep the nation stable 
and therefore enable the government to concentrate on the nation’s development 
and economic growth.  
According to Neier, the fundamental issues in this debate are the denial of 
the freedom of expression and association, arbitrary political imprisonment, 
cruelty to detainees and restrictions on democratic processes.231 In sum, the 
“Asian values” debate comprises three questions, namely (1) the question of 
cultural relativism against universalism, (2) individual rights as opposed to 
communitarianism (rights versus duties and obligations), and (3) the primacy of 
economic development over civil and political rights.232  No consensus has been 
reached on these issues.  
Developmentalism is “the cultural consequence of the dirigiste 
developmentalist state, when citizens begin to enjoy improved living conditions 
as a result of the economic growth the state has brought about.”233 This rationale 
was increasingly used in the mid-1990s to replace the racial harmony discourse. 
It is not surprising that developmental rhetoric was used during that time, 
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because Malaysian government policy has always emphasized implementation 
of the principle of the right to development.234 The central subjects and 
participants of development are the country's population. The people 
acknowledge their roles and responsibility in development. They also recognize 
the state’s responsibility to create national and international conditions favorable 
for the realization of development.235  
2. Reality 
The subscription to “Asian values,” first, is one way to legitimize an 
authoritarian regime. Malaysia, always under the spotlight of many Western 
countries and international NGOs, has been criticized for its authoritarian regime. 
Thus it is not surprising that the Malaysian government has to find another 
rationale for its regime’s legitimization. In the name of economic growth and 
development, the government used “Asian values” discourse to gain support 
from the population, and especially the middle classes. That support was gained 
under the pretext of national identity and nation building. Whoever advocates 
democracy will be seen as “anti-government.” As Mahathir put it, “let us not be 
slaves to democracy . . . if by practicing certain aspects of democracy we run the 
risk of causing chaos in our party and country, we have to choose our party and 
country above democracy.”236 
Second, “Asian values” is used as a rationale to maintain ethnic stability. 
In order to achieve that stability, the government used emergency laws without 
restraint. These repressive (“draconian") laws were used arbitrarily and 
suppressed the rights of the population. In that sense, the Malaysian government 
has regulated many aspects of life which Westerners perceive as 
inappropriate.237 Emergency laws like the ISA, the OSA and the PPPA were 
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used to preserve racial harmony and national security but also to silence political 
opponents, activists and whoever had an ideology different from the government 
ideology. To the government, the ISA made the street safe. In fact, the ISA was 
complemented   by other laws, already discussed, and was used to deter an 
effective challenge to the government. People are willing to surrender their civil 
and political liberties as the price of internal stability.  
D. THE TERRORISM RATIONALE 
The Sept 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. 
caught the world by surprise. After the attacks, the U.S government launched the 
global war on terror (GWOT) initiative. From that point on, many countries 
enacted their own anti-terrorist laws, some of which are similar to the ISA and  
have also encroached on or violated individual rights. For example, in 2001 the 
U.S. enacted the USA PATRIOT Act238  and the U.K. enacted the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act; the following year, Canada passed the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, and India, the Prevention of Terrorism Act.239 
1. Rhetoric 
Prior to the September 11 incidents, a few Western countries criticized 
Malaysia for its poor human rights standards and criticized the ISA and other 
repressive laws.240 These laws were regarded as unconstitutional and were said 
to violate fundamental rights. Not only have the Western countries urged 
Malaysia to adhere to liberal democracy and the universality of human rights, but 
the West has also threatened to use sanctions against the Malaysian economy.  
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The government has been pressured by domestic NGOs, as well as the people 
of Malaysia, to change its human rights practices. After Anwar’s trial, the image 
and reputation of the government was tarnished. 
The September 11 incident was a windfall for the government in Malaysia, 
especially when Mahathir’s popularity and reputation were sliding downhill. 
Neither in Malaysia nor in the international arena was he popular. Because of the 
handling of Anwar’s case and Mahathir’s criticisms of the West, the relationship 
between Malaysia and Western countries, and particularly the United States, 
became severely strained. But since September 11, 2001, Malaysia and the U.S 
have been close friends. Malaysia strongly supports the U.S efforts against 
terrorism and extremism.241 In fact, “the U.S and Malaysia are planning to open a 
joint anti-terrorism training center to instruct Southeast Asian security services on 
how to combat extremist violence.”242 Malaysia became the U.S.’s new ally in 
supporting the GWOT after the two countries signed an anti-terrorism pact in 
May 2002.243 Malaysia's engagement with the major power is an attempt “to 
ensure national, regional and global security.”244 Interestingly, the Western 
countries that had previously criticized Malaysia on its poor human rights record 
have been silent on the extensive use of the ISA. Hassan and Lopez 
characterize this engagement as showing how “political alliances move and shift 
along with the changing political panorama and shared national interests.”245 
2. Reality 
Since the September 11 attack, Mahathir discovered another justification 
for “manipulating the ethno-religious polarization in Malaysia to the liking of the 
government.”246 For the sake of national security, the people surrender their 
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liberties.247 In gaining the people’s support, the most effective government tactic 
has been to claim that PAS is linked to the Al-Qaeda network. This has put PAS 
on the defensive while raising the image of the UMNO as a moderate Islamic 
party. The Observatory rightly commented that “the Dr. Mahathir government has 
skillfully instrumentalized the ‘fight against terrorism’ to consolidate its efforts to 
curtail political opposition (particularly PAS).”248  
The rise of extremist Islamic groups in Malaysia worried the government 
greatly because the government wanted to maintain its reputation and image as 
a supporter of moderate Islam. The government cracked down on several Islamic 
groups that it believed was practicing in ways that violated Islamic norms. In 
1996 and 1997, the government arrested several Muslim men for their 
involvement with Al-Arqam movement249 and for practicing Shia Islam (a form of 
Islam different from the dominant practice in Malaysia). They were alleged to 
have participated in activities prejudicial to national and Muslim unity. In 2000, 
the government arrested fifteen members of Al-Maunnah250 for stealing an 
assortment of small arms and support weapons from an army camp.  
Similarly, in April 2001, the government used the ISA to arrest and detain 
without trial nearly thirty reformists and political activists from opposition political 
parties and NGO activists who had criticized the government. All were accused 
of being involved in illegal activities to topple the Malaysian government. In 
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August 2001, ten members of the Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia251 (KMM) were 
arrested and detained by the Malaysian police under the ISA. These groups were 
alleged to be responsible for a range of crimes, including local bank robberies, 
assassination of a state assemblyman, and bombing of churches and Hindu 
temples.252 Apart from these criminal activities, KMM was also accused of 
attempting to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state coinciding 
with the agenda of a Pan Islamic State in Southeast Asia comprised of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Brunei, southern Thailand and the southern Philippines.253 The 
government also linked the KMM with the Jemaah Islamiah (JI) organization, 
which has cells in various Southeast Asian countries. The Malaysian government 
considered the challenges posed by the Islamic militants to be the greatest 
internal security threat and the government was clearly alarmed at the scope of 
KMM and JI network within its territory.254  
The September 11, 2001 incident was also a saving grace for Mahathir, 
who used the “war against terrorism” to consolidate his position and restore his 
tarnished reputation. At the same time, the terrorism rhetoric enabled Mahathir to 
win back some of the Malay electorate from PAS.  Internationally, he supported 
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the U.S. as well as to increase Malaysia’s status in the Organization of Islamic 
Conference (OIC).255 In general, September 11 strengthened Mahathir’s stature 
around the world.256   
Anti-terrorist rhetoric has been used to retain the ISA. The terrorist threat 
encouraged the government to continue to use the ISA. Furthermore, within 
Southeast Asia, various violent incidents occurred, such as the bombings in Bali 
and at the JW Marriot Hotel and the Australian Embassy in Jakarta. To prevent 
similar incidents from happening in Malaysia, the government has taken concrete 
action.  
Despite all the evidence against the “suspected terrorists,” the government 
has concentrated its spotlight and harassment on political dissidents, detained 
under the ISA, who were alleged to want the overthrow the government.257 If in 
the 1950s and 1960s, the government had used the ISA to arrest people who 
were pro-communist, now they are detaining people without trial on allegations of 
being involved in the militant Islamic movement.258 The crackdowns against 
terrorists and their supporters have been extensive. Suspicions have arisen that 
the crackdowns have been directed at the opposition politicians who demand 
greater democracy from the government. The opposition parties charge the 
government with using terrorism as an excuse to get rid of political opponents. 
This argument is supported by SUARAM, a local NGO, which claimed that the 
government was "using the fight against terrorism as a ‘pretext’ for abusing 
human rights.”259 Foreign Minister Syed Hamid responded, saying, 
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We have never used the ISA for the purpose of frustrating our 
political opponents, but that it is used for the purpose ensuring that 
peace and prosperity of the country is protected. If anybody takes 
action which will jeopardize our security, then we will take action.260 
To date, several hundred people who were “suspected terrorists” or 
directly or indirectly linked to terrorist organizations have been detained without 
trial under the ISA (Table 6 and Table 7).261 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the justification for Malaysia’s human rights 
restrictions. In this context, the government has put priority on several objectives: 
social and economic development, political stability and internal security.262 
Political stability and guaranteed internal security were seen as important for 
economic development. To ensure internal stability, the government used various   
means, including repressive legislation. These legislative measures were 
introduced on the initiative of political leaders intending to strengthen their 
political positions.263 It is not surprising that the political leaders have used this 
legislation to deal with specific challenges to their authority.  
From 1960 to 1980, the ISA was widely used to counter the threat posed 
by the CPM and communist sympathizers within the country. However, during 
this period, there was extensive use of the ISA for purposes outside of combating 
communism. Whoever seemed “prejudicial to the national economy and security” 
would be arrested, including politicians, opposition party leaders, members of 
trade unions, university lecturers and students, and journalists.264 Rais Yatim 
stated in the Sunday Star on December 6, 1994, “the ISA original aim was 
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dealing with communism and controlling terrorism, but now the former is not a 
threat anymore.”265 Despite the end of the communist insurgency, the ISA has 
been used continually and widely.   
Later, when the government used the racial harmony rationale, the ISA 
was again used as an effective tool to crush communal or racial riots. The 
introduction of PPPA, the OSA and the amendment to the Sedition Act further 
silenced the voices of criticism from opposition parties and local NGOs. These 
legislative measures obviously curbed the civil and political liberties of Malaysia’s 
citizens.   
“Using the discourse of “Asian values” or security in response to a 
potential terrorist threat, the government’s prioritization of economic development 
above civil and political rights serves to justify the existing repressive laws used 
to ensure stability by stifling competing views or criticism. The “Asian values” 
discourse and other narratives used by the state play an important role in 
enhancing social control and ensuring state power.”266 Recently, anti-terrorism 
rhetoric has been used widely and has been accepted by the people, who are 
willing to compromise their civil and political rights for the sake of national 
security. Public acceptance provides a blanket approval to the government’s 
actions against suspected terrorists.   
In conclusion, it is clear that in Malaysia, the rationalizations for 
government control have changed over time. These changes in rationalizations 
were inspired by changing situations.  So, for example, anti-communist rhetoric is 
no longer suitable since the communists have surrendered and the Cold War has 
ended. To date, the racial harmony and anti-terrorism rationales are arguably the 
most relevant justifications for repression. These rationales are based on the 
notion that ethnic tension has always existed and the global war on terror is 
ongoing. The bottom line purpose of these rationalizations is to weaken the 
opposition and eliminate criticism of the government. Whatever reasons or 
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justifications the government may give, its actions have been based on political 
motives like increasing the strength of government insiders, and especially 
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V.   RHETORIC AND REALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNAL SECURITY 
Terrorists believe that anything goes in the name of their cause. 
The fight against terror must not buy into that logic. Human rights 
principles must not be compromised in the name of any cause.267  
Kenneth Roth  
Executive Director, Human Rights Watch 
This chapter focuses on how the rhetoric and reality of civil and political 
rights affect internal security in Malaysia. It argues that if the government 
commitment to civil and political rights were merely rhetorical, internal security 
would be undermined. But if the government were to improve civil and political 
rights, it could help to improve internal and political stability, and the government 
itself would become more transparent and effective.  Accordingly, this chapter 
discusses two questions: How do civil and political rights affect internal security? 
and, How far can civil and political rights be abridged for the sake of protecting 
the state’s internal security? To answer these questions, this chapter discusses 
the internal security threats in Malaysia, the adverse effect of restrictions on civil 
and political rights, and the potential positive effects of improving civil and 
political rights.  
A. THE INTERNAL SECURITY THREATS 
After the First Emergency ended in 1960, the government introduced and 
passed the ISA “to provide for the internal security of the Federation, preventive 
detention, the prevention of subversion, the suppression of organized violence 
against persons and property in specified areas of the Federation and for matters 
incidental thereto” in the Parliament.268  The ISA conferred extensive powers on  
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the executive to stop and prevent any actions, threatened or actual, which might 
be prejudicial to the security of Malaysia;269 the ISA was widely used to ensure 
peace.  
The expression “internal security” is often used but seldom legally defined. 
In fact, the term “internal security” is not defined in the ISA. Nevertheless, in 
general, internal security means “the population is free from major threats to their 
safety and . . . the government is able to build stable political, economic and 
other key governance institutions.”270 In short, internal security deals with 
domestic political, economic, social or military matters which might affect the 
safety of the whole society.  
Another consideration which is related closely to internal security is the 
rule of law. Rule of law is to ensure the populations’ safety by protecting people 
from arbitrary use of power by public officials and allowing them to plan their 
affairs with confidence.271 Given the purpose of this thesis, both these factors will 
be considered.  
Malaysian policymakers have been concerned about internal security 
since independence.  For the policymakers, security begins at home.272 Failure 
to ensure the security of the nation, especially from internal threats, would result 
in the collapse of the state. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the internal security 
threats to Malaysia’s stability and security have taken many forms, including the 
communist insurrection, ethnicity and religion. Except when dealing with the 
communist insurrection, the government has generally responded to internal 
threats using legal mechanisms (such as the ISA, the Sedition Act, the OSA and 
the judiciary) rather than security forces. 
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1. Communist Insurrection 
As discussed in Chapters II and IV, the communist insurrection began in 
1948 when the CPM declared its objective of seizing political power through 
armed struggle. As a result, a state of emergency was declared by the 
government and communism became a threat to internal security. The 
government took various actions to encounter communist threats, including the 
use of the legal apparatus and armed actions by the security forces. By the end 
of 1960, the government had successfully stopped the communist insurrection. 
However, in 1968, the CPM began a second offensive against the government. 
This time, the government used security forces, including the military and the 
police, to combat the communist terrorists, along with legal mechanisms such as 
the ISA. Finally, in 1989, the communist armed struggle ended with the signing of 
a peace agreement between the CPM and Malaysia’s government. 
2. Ethnicity 
In a multiethnic society, a major task of the government is to integrate the 
population. According to Lauder and Mansor, population integration is seen as a 
sine qua non for nation building.273 Also, as Camroux  points out, “Ethnicity 
continues to play an essential role in the constant process of giving meaning to 
the concept of a Malaysian nation.”274 Nevertheless, ethnic tension was always a 
problem in this pluralistic society. Mahathir admitted this problem, commenting in 
an interview with Asian Affairs, “In a pluri-ethnic society, if you have the social 
division amplifying the racial division, then you have trouble ahead.”275  
The 1969 race riot illustrated the danger of ethnic tensions which have ever since 
been seen as threats to internal security.  
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a. Racial Harmony 
The race riot awoke Malaysia to the importance of racial harmony. 
The government stressed that racial harmony must be maintained at all costs as 
the only platform to guarantee ethnic security and some autonomous rights.276 
Any attempt to promote ethnic tension and disrupt racial harmony resulted in 
arrests under the ISA, which allowed for detention without trial.277 The 
government also perceived criticism against it as a threat to racial security and 
therefore took action against its critics. For example, during Operation Lalang in 
1987, to prevent the outbreak of future race riots, hundreds of people were 
arrested for promoting ethnic tensions.     
b. The Malay Hegemony 
Malays, as the majority community in Malaysia, are the most 
politically powerful ethnic group.278 As Mauzy and Milne observe, “the Malays 
emerged in the early 1970s, after Emergency rule following the May 1969 riots, in 
a stronger, virtually hegemonic, political position.”279 The BN was dominated by 
the UMNO; this organization should have been looking after the interests of the 
Malays. The three organs of government (executive, legislature, and judiciary) 
are dominated by Malays. The military, police and civil service are dominated by 
the Malay, too. This domination “has given confidence to the Malays, and a 
sense of legitimacy to their demands that the country should solidly reflect a 
Malay character and identity.”280 Thus, it has been important for the government 
to protect Malay hegemony. In fact, the government needs continuous support 
from the Malay in order to implement its policies. Besides getting support, the 
government must also protect Malay hegemony. For the military, as long as 
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Malay interests are protected, as well as the interests of other ethnic groups, the 
principle of civilian supremacy will be respected. But if the two Malay parties 
(UMNO and PAS) could not protect Malay interests, “the prospect of military 
intervention in support of maintaining Malay supremacy cannot be ruled out.”281  
The Anwar crisis has broken down Malay cohesiveness; the Malay 
community has been fragmented. This fragmentation is illustrated by the 1999 
general election.282 The government used the police and judiciary to crack down 
on Anwar’s threat, and since then has been trying to win the “hearts and minds” 
of the Malay.  It is important for the government to gain their support. This led the 
government to justify the arrests of Anwar and his associates as related to 
security.  If the government fails to secure and protect Malay hegemony, it would 
not be surprising to see the government lose its two-thirds parliamentary majority 
to the opposition (particularly the PAS). Therefore, protecting Malay hegemony is 
essential for the survival of UMNO and Malay politics. A challenge to Malay 
hegemony could lead to ethnic disharmony reminiscent of the 1969 race riots.  
3. Religion 
The most significant social phenomenon in Malaysia during the 1970s and 
the 1980s was the growing Islamic resurgence.283 The Islamic resurgence had 
an impact on Malay society, particularly urban Malay youth. In fact, it also posed 
a challenge to the internal unity of UMNO.284 Several UMNO leaders have 
demanded changes to make the party practices more Islamic. The greater 
awareness of Islam has influenced Malays’ everyday life.  People want more 
knowledge of Islam. There have been calls for adherence to Islamic principles in 
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the state’s affairs, such as demands that shariah law replace British law and that 
education be made more Islamic.285 Associations for the purpose of raising 
Islamic consciousness in the Muslim community have increased in number and 
to achieve their aims have developed different modus operandi and shared 
perspectives.  
a. Religious Deviationism 
As a result of the Islamic resurgence, some groups came to be 
regarded as “beyond the pale of orthodoxy an as a source of religiously inspired 
violence.”286 Labeled as “deviationist groups,” these groups were perceived by 
the government as practicing inappropriately or violating Islamic norms in 
Malaysia. Barraclough points out that a minimum of 40 groups with 30,000 
followers (including 17 active groups) were identified as ‘deviant’ in Peninsular 
Malaysia.287 This constitutes a security concern for the government. The Al 
Arqam group, for example, was charged with being deviationist because Ashaari, 
the leader, claimed “to be a messenger of Imam Mahdi, who claimed visionary 
links with the Prophet.” The group treats female members as “sex slaves” and is 
anti-modernization; it sees non Muslims as enemies and hypocrites.288 The most 
serious accusations are that Al Arqam has trained 313 “holy warriors” in Thailand 
to take power in the country289 and that the group is connected to militant Islamic 
activists in the Middle East and North Africa Islamic countries.290  This purported 
link to other groups caused the government to fear that one day Al Arqam 
followers will turn militant and threaten internal security. Defense Minister Najib 
Tun Razak claims that 
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It is a very dangerous form of teaching, which, if left unchecked, 
would cause a severe dislocation in Malaysian society. Obviously, 
they (Al Arqam leaders) have a political agenda, kept secret all this 
while, to gain political power.291 
As a result, Al Arqam has been banned under the Societies Act. 
Ashaari and his followers were arrested under the ISA and released after two 
years in detention.  
Similarly, in 1997, dozens of Shia believers were arrested under the 
ISA.292 The government claimed that “religious disharmony is a national threat 
which places the country’s political and economic development at an unsafe 
position.”293 
From the government perspective, religious deviationism is a 
cancer on Muslim society and deviationist activities must be curtailed before they 
have a chance to spread. Curtailment will also avoid religious sectarian violence 
like that which occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.294 Most of the time, the 
government has used the ISA to counter religious deviationism. The ISA 
succeeded in keeping deviationist religious practices which might threaten 
national security from spreading throughout the Muslim society.    
b. Religious Extremism  
Extremist groups started as religious deviationists. Over time, 
deviationist groups have sometimes developed into religious extremists. The 
government has perceived religious extremists as a serious threat to internal 
security, especially to public order and racial harmony.  For instance, in 1978 five 
Malay fundamentalists attempted to desecrate Indian temple statues in Kerling, 
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Selangor; four of the five were beaten to death.295 Not only did this incident raise 
the specter of racial violence; it also demonstrated “the influence of religious 
extremism among Malay youth.”296  
In 1980, another violent incident occurred in Batu Pahat, Johore 
when twenty men in white robes, armed with swords, attacked a police station.297  
A number of police and civilians were severely injured and eight attackers were 
killed. The leader of the group was a Cambodian Muslim convert. According to 
Barraclough, the group had planned a jihad to capture Peninsular Malaysia and 
then march to the USSR.298  
Obviously, these incidents raised communal tensions in Malaysia 
and resulted in religion clashes. Thus they threatened internal security. Religious 
clashes elsewhere, like between the Muslims and Christians in Moluccas of 
Indonesia, and between the Hindus and Muslims in India, provide good examples 
of how such conflicts can undermine internal security. Hence, the connections 
between religious deviationism and extremism cannot be denied. One might 
argue that the former does not necessarily become the latter, but in many 
instances, deviationists turn into extremists.  
Using preventive legislation, the government has successfully 
ended the communist insurrection and threats posed by religious deviationists 
and extremists. The government has not hesitated to use its power against those 
who tried to encroach on domestic security. As Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi 
points out, 
We . . . have zero tolerance for ethnic and religious extremism that 
threatens the peace and the welfare of our citizens. We consider 
ethnic and religious excesses particularly dangerous, for they have 
a tendency to evoke powerful passions that are difficult to rein in 
once they take hold. The political, economic and social damage 
 
                                            
295 Barraclough, “Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia – A Regime 
Perspective,” 960. 
296 Ibid. 
297 Ibid., 961. 
298 Ibid.  
100
 they cause can be prohibitive, and linger long after the event. We 
therefore have in place tough laws, and some of them are 
preventive in nature.299 
The government is serious about ensuring the security of the 
people, a seriousness demonstrated by its efforts in combating terrorism in the 
1990s and especially since 2001. 
In combating terrorism, the government has taken pre-emptive 
actions against “domestic terrorists” such as members of Al-Ma’unah and 
Jemaah Islamiah (JI), as well as the ambiguous (and perhaps nonexistent) 
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM).300 The government used the ISA as a 
counter measure before these groups could do any harm. To date, the 
government has managed to prevent terrorists from creating havoc. 
Since the PAS challenged the UMNO, the government (dominated 
by the UMNO) has perceived the PAS as a source of internal security threats. 
Hence, the government has put PAS activities under government surveillance. In 
addition to heavy surveillance, tight regulation has also been imposed on the 
party’s operations, including their newspaper (Harakah), which may be circulated 
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only to party members. Its editor and publisher have been charged under the 
Sedition Act defamation law or the Printing, Presses and Publication Act 
(PPPA).301 Some party members and leaders have been arrested periodically 
under the ISA. The government has also tried to tarnish the PAS image by 
portrayed its members as extremist, deviationists, radicals, fanatics or even 
terrorists.302 After September 11, 2001, the government linked PAS to Al-Qaeda 
and JI, and arrested a few PAS members. This tactic has allowed UMNO to gain 
popular support against PAS, as revealed in the 2004 general election. 
B. THE ADVERSE EFFECT OF RESTRICTING OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON 
INTERNAL SECURITY  
Restrictions on human rights have met strong protests from a number of 
groups: the opposition parties (DAP, PAS, PRM and Keadilan), local and 
international human rights groups (Suaram, Hakam, Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International), and NGOs such as Aliran, Women’s Aid Organization 
and Gerak. The question then arises whether internal security will be affected if 
the Malaysian government does not improve human rights conditions.  If the 
answer is affirmative, then what are the effects on internal security? Is there a 
relationship between human rights and internal security?  
This was Malaysia’s dilemma: “to choose between unconditional respect 
for human rights and the need to safeguard a seriously threatened public 
order.”303 Arguably, the effects are double-edged. Any adverse effects on internal 
security from government restrictions on human rights are unclear. To date, no 
serious incident affecting internal security has occurred in Malaysia; however, the 
potential for such incidents must be considered.  
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The first of the hypothetical effects of human rights on internal security is 
its impact on internal stability.  Internal security has been the government’s 
primary concern, as it believes that the nation’s stability should be preserved at 
all cost, even the undermining of citizens’ rights.  
Continual suppression of people’s rights has the potential to cause internal 
instability. Some people might go underground to operate as an alternative. 
Normally, underground movements were deemed to be subversive groups that 
might resort violence to achieve their objectives. For example, when the CPM 
was banned, it launched a secret campaign, penetrating Chinese schools and 
trade unions to spread its ideology. In struggling to uphold its ideology, the CPM 
succeeded; it recruited cadre from Chinese school leavers, persuaded trade 
unions to launch strikes against the government, and carried out terror activities 
like the assassination of the Inspector General of Police in 1974 and the National 
Monument bombing in 1975. Al Maunnah’s group is another example of an 
underground movement. Initially, this group was registered as a martial arts 
association; its militant activities were secret until it raided an army camp.  
A second effect of human rights is on Malaysia’s domestic economy. 
Malaysia’s economy has been very dependent on exports and foreign 
investment. Thus, the Malaysian economy has to compete with globalization, 
deal with strong foreign direct investment by China, and overcome the barriers to 
its “rapid transformation into a knowledge-driven economy.”304 To sustain itself in 
the world economy, Malaysia needs to transform its economy. Malaysia 
perceived its economic viability and competitiveness as security problems due to 
the real threat during the financial crisis in 1997. But by restricting human rights, 
the government discourages the population from being innovative or critical of 
government economic policies such as the New Economic Policy. After twenty 
years (1970 – 1990), NEP could not achieve its aim of ethnic equality, due to “the 
weak official commitment to address the problems of poor Chinese in the new 
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villages and the predominantly Indian workers in the plantation sector.”305  This 
may have the potential to exacerbate ethnic conflicts among the Malay, the 
Chinese and the Indians, furthering internal insecurity. 
Third, without improvements in the human rights situation, the gate is left 
open for police brutality and abuse of power. Although the police have the power 
to detain any person arbitrarily for 60 days, they should not abuse the human 
rights safeguards in the Criminal Procedure Code and Lockup Rules. The police 
should protect human rights and follow the rule of law. Also, corruption has been 
epidemic in the police forces. Table 10 illustrates how the level of corruption in 
the police force has increased over time. One should bear in mind that Table 10 
includes reported cases of corruption, but including unreported cases, the actual 
number may be higher.306  Corrupt and brutal police make the police forces 
ineffective, and this encourages people to commit crimes. Furthermore, people 
are deterred from reporting wrongful acts by police personnel. If the court finds 
that the report of corruption or wrongdoing is incorrect, the person who reported it 
can be charged under relevant law.  If the police forces are inefficient, internal 
security is affected.  
 
Table 9.   Information on Corruption Received in PDRM and Actions Taken by 
Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA), Malaysia 2000-2004 (From: Report of 
The Royal Commission to Enhance the Operation and Management of 
The Royal Malaysian Police and Anti-Corruption Agency’s Report, 
Various Issues. (2004). Report of The Royal Commission to Enhance 
the Operation of The Royal Malaysian Police, Kuala Lumpur). 
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No. Subject 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
 PDRM PDRM PDRM PDRM PDRM 




















6. ACAR  24 56 54 42 47 
(32%) 
Total  1651  1739 1852 1844  2002  
Note:  IP:  Investigation Paper  
          IR:  Intelligence Report  
       ACAR:  Anti-Corruption Agency’s Report  
PDRM:  Royal Malaysia Police Number in brackets reflects the percentage of 
cases received on PDRM out of the total information received on 
corruption in Malaysia. 
 
Fourth, the judiciary has been deprived its independence since 1998.307 
The courts have been reluctant to deal with human rights cases. The court’s 
power of judicial review was abolished by Mahathir. It can be safely said that 
since 1998, the judiciary has been undermined by the executive. Moreover, the 
Attorney General has practiced selective prosecution, as seen in the case 
against the Chief Minister of Malacca for statutory rape. Surprisingly, the 
wrongdoer was released and the person who reported the crime was sentenced 
to imprisonment.308 Selective prosecution and discriminatory justice may cause 
popular dissatisfaction and opposition, along with public insecurity.  
Fifth, if the human rights situation is not improved, all possible checks and 
balances will have been invalidated. No branch of the government should be 
allowed to operate without checks. The principle of separation of powers has 
been gradually eroded by the executive. Instead of “rule of law,” the executive 
has controlled the country through “rule by law.” With the notion of having a 
strong state, the government believed that the executive should be stronger than 
the other branches.  It is necessary to adhere to the doctrine of separation of 
powers or an independent judiciary.309 As Arshad points out,  
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Parliament’s powers, prerogative and administration functions must 
not be handed over to the executive. To allow such a move would 
be akin to allowing the erosion of the doctrine of separation of 
power (or what’s left of it).310    
By ruling through “rule by law,” the internal situation can become unstable 
and result in havoc.   
Sixth, civil and political rights are the basic premise of democracy. In fact, 
these rights have been greatly suppressed by the Malaysian government. When 
these rights are suppressed, the democratic process is eroded.  
In Malaysia, the substance of democracy has been more important than 
its form. Mahathir pointed out the incapability of the strong Western countries to 
handle simple problems.  In his view, they were led by weak leaders because 
“these countries practice a distorted form of democracy; a democracy that 
stresses form rather than substance. Democracy has become an article of faith 
wherein its worship is far more important than the practical results obtained from 
it.”311 To him, the ignorance of democracy’s substance would weaken the 
legitimacy of constitutional institutions. He also asserted that “the western type of 
democracy will not help the Asian nations and that a ‘controlled democracy’ is 
most suited for a nation like Malaysia.”312  
To Mahathir, as long as Malaysia conducted periodic elections and the 
opposition parties still existed, freedom of expression, association and speech 
were not important. He stated as much in 1993, before the Council on Foreign 
Relations.  
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Majority rule, minority rights, freedom from oppression, freedom 
from hunger, freedom of association, freedom of the press and the 
right to free speech, transparency, the rule of law and a host of 
other ideas and thoughts linked directly or obliquely with 
democracy--all these need to be examined.313 
In reality, the people should be given rights to participate in the decision 
making process that determines their lives.314 “Participation in elections would be 
void of meaning, unless there is freedom of expression and association sufficient 
to create a space for a real political competition.”315 In an undemocratic nation, 
there will always be antagonisms. The cleavages between races or political 
parties make the nation less secure.  
The government’s recent trend has been to label dissidents as 
“extremists” in order to discredit them. This has been done to cause confusion 
between the concepts of “extremist” and “terrorist.”316 Literally, “extremist” means 
radical, or departing from the norm, while “terrorist” means a systematic use of 
terror or coercion.317 The government argues that one is usually an “extremist” 
before turning into a “terrorist”. Further, “terrorists” used coercion and often 
violence to achieve their objectives. Additionally, their targets will be government 
agencies which may involve innocent people and the public at large. Hence, 
when a group has been labeled “terrorist,” it is a very serious accusation which 
involves the idea that the group is willing to resort to violence.  
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The government has accused dissidents of being extremists by 
bombarding the people with rhetoric through the government controlled media. In 
the long term, this propaganda may affect civil society because the public may 
fail to differentiate between “extremists” and true “terrorists.” The government has 
created an environment for “rational debate on certain issues and fueled the fire 
with racism.”318 The first step was the government’s labeling the dissidents as 
“anti-government.” The second step, when dissidents started to debate the issue 
publicly, was the government labeling them as “extremist.” In the third step, the 
ruling party leaders criticized the dissidents and described them with words such 
as “chauvinistic,” “unpatriotic,” “dangerous,” and “seditious.” Finally, the state-
controlled media has portrayed the group as “extremist” and called on the 
government to invoke repressive laws such as the ISA or Sedition Act.319  This 
systematic repression was carried out in 2001 against the Dong Jiao Zong, a 
Chinese education group which opposed changing from the use of the Chinese 
to the English language in science and mathematics in Chinese primary 
schools.320  
The PAS faced the same problem when the government labeled it as 
“extremist” and subsequently linked it with terrorist organizations. In fact, several 
PAS members were targeted and detained under the ISA by the government as 
“terrorists,” including the Kelantan Chief Minister’s son. Using this tactic and 
exploiting public fears, the government succeeded in gaining support from the 
public. Also, the public was perceived as giving the government consent to act 
against terrorists.321  
Malaysia is fortunate because to date, the adversarial effects discussed 
above have not been manifested by the people. There are several reasons.  
People are not willing to lose what they have (property, money and good 
employment, for example). They are not willing sacrifice by moving out of their 
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“comfort zone” and they do not want to live in conflict.  People are too tired to 
fight for civil and political rights.  And they are complacent, accepting the existing 
situation in Malaysia. This trend, it is believed, may continue for another decade. 
C. THE POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF IMPROVING HUMAN RIGHTS 
TO INTERNAL SECURITY  
Just as restrictions on human rights has the potential to damage internal 
security, improving human rights can conceivably strengthen it. First, if human 
rights are improved, subversive activities may decrease. At the very least, people 
will have alternative way to air their views on controversial issues. And, too, there 
can be more open discussions with the NGOs and the government. At the same 
time, people’s loyalty to the state may increase. They are likely to appreciate 
their rights and desire to protect their government from threats. They may 
perceive that changing to an alternate form of government could result in more 
restrictions on their rights. Hence, if it were to become necessary, the people 
might be more willing to sacrifice and defend their country in order to preserve 
their rights.322  
Second, by improving the human rights situation, the government’s 
transparency, accountability and effectiveness levels will be improved. The rule 
of law will always check human rights violations by the other government 
branches and maintain the stability of the country. If Malaysia is stable, it will 
more easily attract foreign investors to the country, simultaneously improving the 
nation’s economy. This investment would help the government to decrease the 
unemployment rate and subsequently decrease poverty. At the same time, the 
government would be able to put its efforts into development, so that people will 
have their basic needs met and productivity can increase.323   
Third, the improvement of human rights might enhance the capability of 
the police forces. Police activities could be checked by an independent 
commission to ensure that the rule of law is respected. This might also curtail 
criminal activities, and thus increase the level of internal security. People may be 
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more willing to report police violations of human rights or police brutality. When a 
state is secure, the population can live in peace and harmony. Thus, there will be 
no civil war in the country, which could reduce arms trafficking, political and civil 
refugees, and uncontrolled degradation of the environment.324 
Fourth, the improvement of human rights would allow the free flow of 
information, which would facilitate innovation, efficiency and entrepreneurship 
among the population. The people would be free to invoke their creativity and 
also to think critically for the betterment of all. This might assist Malaysia in 
achieving its 2020 vision. Malaysia might become a model for other countries on 
how to reconcile human rights and internal security in a pluralistic nation. The 
improvement of human rights would encourage healthy dialogue between civil 
society and the government on human rights issues. In this respect, SUHAKAM 
could play a role as mediator, bringing together the government and civil society 
and opening the opportunity to develop a stronger civil society.  
Fifth, judicial control and the democratic process should be balanced and 
serve as checks for one another. “The harmonious balance between the rule of 
law and democratic process remains a valid normative ideal . . . and it is routinely 
repeated in constitutions enacted in the last decades.” 325 As Petrova points out, 
“The rule of law in a democratic society is a prerequisite and main vehicle for the 
protection of human rights.”326 
D. THE BALANCE BETWEEN INTERNAL SECURITY AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
At the present stage, internal security is the main concern of the 
Malaysian government. To insure internal security, the government has adopted 
a repressive attitude towards the population.  It has exercised this attitude 
through special laws designed to strengthen internal security and protect society 
from the threat of subversive activities. These special laws impose restrictions 
and abridge certain freedoms to hinder potential threats. In so doing, however, 
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the government has violated human rights and curbed the civil liberties of certain 
groups. This situation itself poses a security dilemma: How far can civil and 
political rights be abridged by the government for the sake of protecting the 
state’s internal security? 
Civil and political rights were provided under Part II of the federal 
Constitution, as previously mentioned. Part II provides the pillars of the civil and 
political rights to which Malaysians are entitled. However, these rights are not 
absolute. Restrictions have been imposed on each right in the form of legislation 
(see Table 7). This might mean that the population consented to the restrictions 
on civil and political rights through their representatives in the Parliament. 
Although the restrictions were initiated by the government, the House of 
Representatives and Senate should exercise scrutiny prior to endorsing the laws. 
Because the government controlled a two-thirds majority in both houses, the 
process of endorsement was shortened; there were no setbacks. In short, the 
government is the sole decision maker on grants of civil and political liberties to 
its population.  
Civil and political rights in Malaysian political history have been eroding 
since the 1960s. The September 11, 2001 incident served as a catalyst to the 
further deterioration of human rights in Malaysia. It is not necessary for Malaysia 
to enact new counterterrorism laws. However, since the September 11 incident, 
the GWOT has provided the government with an excuse to crack down on 
political opponents and religious groups. The government, particularly under 
Mahathir, used the anti-terrorism campaign to harass and punish individuals and 
groups perceived as critical of the government and therefore as political threats 
to the regime. Human Rights Watch reported in 2004 that “the Internal Security 
Act was used by the government to imprison pro democracy activists, students, 
alleged extremists, and supporters of Anwar.”327 
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The use of the ISA to reduce terrorist threats has raised concerns among 
human rights advocates. They worry because this legislation “has measures 
[that] abridge the human rights and curtail civil liberties of suspected persons 
who are actually innocent of any wrongdoing.”328 Detention without trial violates 
human rights and might be dangerous to the future of democratic society.329 
Besides detention without trial, the ISA also promotes the culture of fear and the 
oppressive impact of the actual detention.330  Moreover, this law prevents the 
suspect from getting judicial review by the courts. The ISA has been used 
continually since 1960. To rationalize the supposedly short term curbing of civil 
and political liberties, the impression was given that repressive laws are 
necessary to preserve internal security for the long term. The government 
emphasized that total free exercise of civil liberties might undermine national 
security. Thus, lessening those rights would make the population safer.331 When 
the government can convict people on grounds of national security, its tendency 
to abuse power increases. As Joyner rightly comments, the government should 
not abridge guaranteed fundamental liberties without close and careful scrutiny. It 
is safe to suggest that Malaysia does not need to enact new laws to combat 
terrorism because the existing laws are sufficient to protect national security 
against any threats.  
It is important to balance the rights of individuals and the security of the 
state, especially after September 11 attack. Without a balance, those who are 
arrested will not receive fair trials. It also seems prudent for Malaysians to 
undertake a periodic review of existing laws and evaluate their efficacy, so that 
laws that infringe fundamental liberties might be repealed or amended.  
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E. CONCLUSION 
Since its inception, Malaysia has focused on combating domestic threats; 
internal security has been the government’s main concern. When the communist 
insurgency ended in 1989, Malaysia faced different forms of internal threats. 
Most came from the religious extremists and deviationists. The government 
managed to solve those problems. Since then, threats to internal security have 
come from various sources: terrorism, racial tensions, the Malay hegemony, and 
the Islamic challenges from PAS. In dealing with these threats, the government 
has used the ISA to arrest people perceived as prejudicial to national security. 
Although the arrests violated human rights, the government believed the actions 
necessary to prevent future problems.  
The relationship between human rights and internal security is ambivalent. 
It is difficult to explain the situation in Malaysia.  On the one hand, human rights 
have been suppressed and violated; on the other hand, the situation has been 
stable, the people living in peace and harmony. It might be said that in the case 
of Malaysia, there is no significant relationship between human rights and 
internal security. The adversarial effects discussed in Section B of this chapter 
are hypothetical effects. It was assumed that if the human rights condition is not 
improved, the consequences might include the following: continued abuse of 
power by public officials, erosion of the principle of separation of power, ethnic 
tensions, domestic instability, political instability and labeling dissidents as 
“extremists.” Since 1969 race riot, there has been no major incident of internal 
instability. Although Anwar’s crisis boosted the human rights struggle, the 
government managed to destabilize the movement. In addition, the GWOT has 
contributed to the collapse of the struggle for human rights in Malaysia. 
However, if the government improves human rights, subversive activities 
could be controlled. Improvements in human rights would increase the loyalty of 
citizens, improve police capability and reduce crime, and improve the nation’s 
governance. Thus, improvements in human rights will make Malaysia an 
example to other developing countries, and increase the government’s 
transparency and effectiveness.  
113
Furthermore, human rights help guarantee internal stability. When a nation 
is stable, foreigners will not hesitate to invest there, which will improve the 
national economy and give the population new business opportunities. Foreign 
investment and greater employment improve and strengthen a nation’s economy, 
allowing it to better participate in the world economy.  When the economy is 
strong, the people will live in peace and harmony. The improvement of human 
rights always benefits a nation. 
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VI. SUMMARY  
It is not easy for a people conditioned by the iron rule of the 
principle that might is right to free themselves from the enervating 
miasma of fear. Yet even under the most crushing state machinery 
courage rises up again and again, for fear is not the natural state of 
civilized man.332 
                                                                                                    Aung San Suu Kyi 
This thesis has looked at the integration of Malays, the Chinese, and 
Indians into the plural society of Malaysia. Pluralism in Malaysia has always been 
a source of ethnic tensions and political instabilities, as evidenced in the First 
Emergency and the 1969 race riot. The government’s reaction to the race riot 
significantly changed the political landscape from consociationalism to semi-
democracy. As a semi-democratic nation, Malaysia has conducted regular 
elections while at the same time restricting civil and political liberties.  
The condition of human rights in Malaysia from 1957 to 2005 has been 
examined. The thesis demonstrates that the human rights situation has evolved 
over time. In general, at the early stage of independence, there was liberal rule 
concerning human rights, although there were also abuses of power by the 
government. During the term of the first Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, 
human rights were not a major concern, as political leaders focused on nation-
building and economic development. For a newly independent nation, these 
factors were crucial for stability and security. In this period, the government used 
legal means to counter internal threats, including those from the communists and 
radical Malay leftists.  
As indicated in Chapter II, the 1969 race riot was the turning point for 
human rights practice and the Malaysia political landscape. This thesis illustrated 
the consequences of the riot, in which the government under the second prime 
minister, Abdul Razak, restricted some human rights, especially civil and political 
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rights. For instance, freedom of speech, freedom of expression and freedom of 
assembly were restrained by the Sedition Act. Under the pretext of maintaining 
national unity, Razak continued to arrest political dissidents whom he perceived 
as presenting a challenge to the regime or a serious threat to public order.  
Despite continual use of the Internal Security Act, other laws, such as the 
Industrial Relations Act and Trade Union Act and Universities and Colleges Act, 
were amended to regulate and limit workers’ and the students’ political activity. It 
is safe to say that during Razak’s term, civil and political rights shrunk and were 
tightened more than in Tunku’s period. The situation remained unchanged, even 
when Hussein Onn held office as Malaysia’s the third prime minister.  
The thesis describes how civil and political rights were weakened under 
Mahathir’s premiership. During his term, Mahathir centralized all the power in the 
hands of the executive.333 He did not respect the principle of separation of 
powers334 and did not even believe in democracy.335 Not only did he limit civil 
and political rights; he also eliminated the independence of the judiciary and the 
mass media. He used the courts to make decisions favorable to the government. 
The mass media was controlled by ownership or by the Printing Press 
Publication Act.  During Mahathir’s rule, the ISA and other repressive laws were 
used arbitrarily to serve his own interest. Legislation was used to silence criticism 
of himself or his party by political enemies, political dissidents, nongovernmental 
organization activists and journalists. Beginning in 2000, the number of ISA 
detainees increased. Mahathir also used racial harmony, “Asian values,” 
developmentalism and terrorism as justifications to legitimize his actions against 
opponents. He perceived those who opposed government action as anti-
government or as “Western tools” or even traitors who might threaten national 
security. The onset of the Global War on Terrorism gave Mahathir an excuse to 
further extend restrictions on civil and political rights. Mahathir’s continued 
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restraint of civil and political rights was driven by his desire to make the executive 
stronger and to defend his position as a prime minister.  
This thesis also shows that after Mahathir’s rule, the Malaysian civil and 
political rights situation did not change. So far, promises to improve civil and 
political rights by the fifth prime minister, Abdullah Badawi, have not been 
translated into actions—they are merely empty promises.336 The government’s 
slow reaction to the Malaysia National Human Rights Commission’s (Suhakam) 
recommendations further aggravated the human rights situation. The 
government’s failure to react to the Suhakam’s recommendations demonstrated 
its unwillingness to improve human rights. Moreover, Suhakam was deemed to 
be a government tool to silence criticism from domestic organizations and the 
international community. In addition to silencing the critics, Suhakam was also 
seen as enhancing the government’s image in the eyes of the world. Given these 
perceptions, it is safe to characterize Suhakam as a “toothless” organization. 
Civil and political rights in Malaysia have been severely curtailed since the 
1970s. Before then, the government felt it had to justify any action to restrict the 
civil and political rights of particular groups. For example, in the 1960s, the anti-
communism rationale was used by the government to counter communist 
insurgents, sympathizers, and those directly involved with communist activities. 
Surprisingly, during that period, few political opposition party leaders were 
arrested under the ISA and accused of communist activity.   
After the communist threat ended, the government used racial harmony to 
justify the continual use of repressive legislation against its own people.  Indeed, 
after the race riot in 1969, racial harmony and national unity became the 
government’s main focus. Whoever tried to promote ethnic tensions was arrested 
under the ISA or under other repressive laws, such as the Sedition Act or the 
PPPA. And again, the government targeted opposition party leaders and 
members and NGO activists.  
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Later, the notion of “Asian values” was used to legitimize Mahathir’s 
actions to limit civil and political rights. Mahathir stressed that “Asian values,” 
which emphasizes family and diverse cultures, were suitable for Malaysian 
society. He thought that economic and development issues should prevail over 
the concept of individual rights that had been promoted by the Westerners. At the 
same time, Mahathir used his authoritarian style to continually suppress civil and 
political rights. One might correctly say that the rationales of “Asian values” and 
Developmentalism were used to authorize an authoritarianism regime and to 
legitimize government actions against the population.  
After the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States, the threat of 
terrorism became a new rationale to further limit the Malaysian population’s civil 
and political rights. By portraying and linking Parti Islam SeMalaysia to terrorist 
organizations, the government succeeded in gaining support, especially from 
Malays. Further, the government launched pre-emptive arrests against 
suspected terrorists and whoever was linked to or supported terrorist groups 
(including political dissidents) and as a result paralyzed terrorist activities in 
Malaysia.  
The relationship between human rights and internal security in Malaysia is 
ambiguous. Improving or not improving the human rights situation has not 
affected internal security. Ethnic tensions undeniably still exist, but at a very low 
intensity. Incidents described in Chapters III and IV show that the government 
managed to contain these tensions by using legal mechanisms, like the ISA and 
the Sedition Act. The Anwar Ibrahim crisis boosted the human rights struggle in 
Malaysia but the GWOT changed everything. The government manipulated the 
terrorism issue, and terrorism has given the government a strong justification to 
continue suppressing the rights of the people. In the name of national security, 
many people seem willing to sacrifice their rights.  And if this is so, it is safe to 
suggest that the government is unlikely to face powerful incentives to improve the 
country’s human rights.   
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